備注：
1. 芒格主義 —— 查理·芒格智慧箴言 + 大道點(diǎn)評（上）
2. 沃倫·巴菲特永恒智慧名言集 —— 附大道點(diǎn)評
正文：
75. Many markets get down to two or three big competitors—or five or six. And in some of those markets, nobody makes any money to speak of. But in others, everybody does very well.? Over the years, we’ve tried to figure out why the competition in some markets gets sort of rational from the investor’s point of view so that the shareholders do well, and in other markets, there’s destructive competition that destroys shareholder wealth.? If it’s a pure commodity like airline seats, you can understand why no one makes any money. As we sit here, just think of what airlines have given to the world—safe travel, greater experience, time with your loved ones, you name it. Yet, the net amount of money that’s been made by the shareholders of airlines since Kitty Hawk, is now a negative figure—a substantial negative figure. Competition was so intense that, once it was unleashed by deregulation, it ravaged shareholder wealth in the airline business.? Yet, in other fields—like cereals, for example—almost all the big boys make out. If you’re some kind of a medium grade cereal maker, you might make 15% on your capital. And if you’re really good, you might make 40%. But why are cereals so profitable—despite the fact that it looks to me like they’re competing like crazy with promotions, coupons and everything else? I don’t fully understand it.? Obviously, there’s a brand identity factor in cereals that doesn’t exist in airlines. That must be the main factor that accounts for it.And maybe the cereal makers by and large have learned to be less crazy about fighting for market share—because if you get even one person who’s hell-bent on gaining market share…. For example, if I were Kellogg and I decided that I had to have 60% of the market, I think I could take most of the profit out of cereals. I’d ruin Kellogg in the process. But I think I could do it. You must have the confidence to override people with more credentials than you whose cognition is impaired by incentive-caused bias or some similar psychological force that is obviously present. But there are also cases where you have to recognize that you have no wisdom to add – and that your best course is to trust some expert.
許多市場最終會形成兩到三個(gè)大競爭者，或者五到六個(gè)。其中有些市場里壓根兒沒有人能賺到什么錢。有些市場里每個(gè)競爭者都做得不錯(cuò)。多年以來，我們一直在研究，為什么有些市場里競爭比較理性，股東們獲得的回報(bào)都不錯(cuò)，而有些市場里的競爭則讓股東血本無歸。我們舉航空公司的例子來說吧，咱們現(xiàn)在坐在這里，可以想到航空公司們?yōu)槭澜缱鞒龅母鞣N貢獻(xiàn)：安全的旅行、更好的體驗(yàn)、能夠隨時(shí)飛向你的愛人，等等。但是，這個(gè)行業(yè)自從萊特兄弟的時(shí)代以來，給股東們回報(bào)的總利潤是負(fù)的，而且是一個(gè)巨大的負(fù)數(shù)。這個(gè)市場里的競爭是如此激烈，以至于一旦放開監(jiān)管，航空公司們就開始用大降價(jià)來損害股東們的權(quán)益。然而，在另外一些行業(yè)里，比如麥片行業(yè)，幾乎所有的競爭者都混得挺舒服。如果你是一家中型的麥片生產(chǎn)商，你大概能有15%的資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率。如果你的本事特別好，甚至能達(dá)到40%。但是為什么麥片這么掙錢呢？在我看來他們整天搞各種瘋狂的營銷、推廣、優(yōu)惠券來激烈競爭，竟然還這么掙錢。我不是很明白。顯然，品牌效應(yīng)的因素是麥片行業(yè)有而航空行業(yè)沒有的。這可能是個(gè)主要因素。或者麥片生產(chǎn)商們有共識，認(rèn)為誰都不可以那么瘋狂地競爭，因?yàn)槿绻幸粋€(gè)二楞子視市場占有率如命根，比如說如果我是家樂氏的老板然后我決定要搶占60%的市場占有率，我想我可以把這個(gè)市場的大部分利潤都給弄沒了。這個(gè)過程中我可能會把家樂氏給毀掉。但是我想我還是可以做到占據(jù)市場以及消滅行業(yè)利潤。你應(yīng)該有信心去顛覆那些比你資深的人，條件是他們的認(rèn)知被動機(jī)導(dǎo)致的偏見蒙蔽了、或者被類似的心理因素明顯影響了。但是在另外一些情況下，你應(yīng)該認(rèn)識到你也許沒有什么新意可想，你最好的選擇就是相信這些領(lǐng)域中的專家。
（大道批注：我認(rèn)為和產(chǎn)品的差異化程度有關(guān)。產(chǎn)品差異化程度越低，行業(yè)內(nèi)的企業(yè)越難賺到錢。航空公司是極致，就是因?yàn)楫a(chǎn)品差異化小。還有一個(gè)極致的例子就是現(xiàn)在很多做太陽能硅片的，下場會比航空公司還慘。芒格說他不懂不知道是什么意思，或許是調(diào)侃的吧？感覺上最沒有差異化的產(chǎn)品就是硅片，因?yàn)橛脩糇詈笾粫P(guān)心每度電的成本，所以這個(gè)行業(yè)實(shí)際上是效率的競爭。長期而言，只有某些能真的做出高效率光電轉(zhuǎn)換的產(chǎn)品的企業(yè)才能生存下來，而且他們的產(chǎn)品以后很可能就是發(fā)電廠。航空公司實(shí)際上的差異化也非常小，除非某航空公司的安全性被懷疑，否則消費(fèi)者的關(guān)心點(diǎn)會主要集中在從a點(diǎn)到b點(diǎn)的成本。當(dāng)然，服務(wù)態(tài)度會有一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)差異（如果服務(wù)態(tài)度很不好則會有很大差異）。所以以上兩個(gè)行業(yè)會是價(jià)格競爭異常激烈的行業(yè)。你說的其他幾個(gè)行業(yè)的差異化程度都比這兩個(gè)行業(yè)或多或少要高一些。有些行業(yè)看起來差異化很小，其實(shí)有些“小東西”會造成很大的差異化，比如零售的地理位置往往會讓人們會覺得方便比價(jià)錢重要等等，尤其是價(jià)錢不貴的東西。吃喝的東西心理上的差異化其實(shí)很大的，當(dāng)然渠道的差異化也很厲害，比如可口可樂的護(hù)城河中在哪里都能買到這點(diǎn)是非常厲害的。）
76. In business we often find that the winning system goes almost ridiculously far in maximizing and or minimizing one or a few variables — like the discount warehouses of Costco.
我們發(fā)現(xiàn)那些在生意中優(yōu)勝的“系統(tǒng)”往往有些變量被近乎荒謬地最大化或者最小化，比如Costco的打折倉儲店。
77. There are worse situations than drowning in cash and sitting, sitting, sitting. I remember when I wasn’t awash in cash — and I don’t want to go back.
有些情況比坐擁大量現(xiàn)金無處可投更糟糕。我還記得當(dāng)年缺錢的情景，我可不想回到那個(gè)時(shí)候。
78. If you always tell people why, they’ll understand it better, they’ll consider it more important, and they’ll be more likely to comply.
如果你（在發(fā)出指令和訴求的時(shí)候）總是告訴他們你的原因，他們就會更好地理解你的意圖，并且覺得你的想法更重要，他們也就更愿意聽你的。
79. Spend less than you make; always be saving something. Put it into a tax-deferred account. Over time, it will begin to amount to something. This is such a no-brainer.
量入而出、時(shí)刻攢錢、把錢放到可以延期交稅的賬戶里。時(shí)間長了，你就會攢出一筆財(cái)富了。這完全不需要?jiǎng)邮裁茨X子。
80. I try to get rid of people who always confidently answer questions about which they don’t have any real knowledge.”
我盡量遠(yuǎn)離那些不懂裝懂的人。
（大道批注：知道自己的能力圈在哪遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)比能力圈有多大重要，投資的人絕大多數(shù)都是倒在能力圈外的，雖然大多數(shù)最后都不明白為什么中的招。不過，因?yàn)榭戳诉@句話就認(rèn)為自己有能力圈了也是蠻有趣的。）
81. I believe in the discipline of mastering the best that other people have ever figured out. I don’t believe in just sitting down and trying to dream it all up yourself. Nobody’s that smart.
我覺得先好好掌握別人已經(jīng)整理好的知識才是靠譜的學(xué)習(xí)方法。我不認(rèn)可那種閉門造車自己鼓搗出結(jié)果的方法。沒人能那么聰明。
82. I know someone who lives next door to what you would actually call a fairly modest house that just sold for $17 million. There are some very extreme housing price bubbles going on.
我有個(gè)熟人，他們家旁邊那個(gè)房子看起來很不起眼的，但是竟然賣了1700萬美元。房市價(jià)格有很極端的泡沫。
83. Experience tends to confirm a long-held notion that being prepared, on a few occasions in a lifetime, to act promptly in scale, in doing some simple and logical thing, will often dramatically improve the financial results of that lifetime. A few major opportunities, clearly recognizable as such, will usually come to one who continuously searches and waits, with a curious mind that loves diagnosis involving multiple variables. And then all that is required is a willingness to bet heavily when the odds are extremely favorable, using resources available as a result of prudence and patience in the past.
經(jīng)驗(yàn)告訴我們，當(dāng)機(jī)會來臨的時(shí)候，如果你有足夠的準(zhǔn)備并且適時(shí)、果斷、有魄力地做一些簡單而合理的事情，就能奇跡般地讓你致富。偶爾出現(xiàn)的這種機(jī)會往往賜予那些時(shí)刻準(zhǔn)備著、一直搜尋著、并且愿意分析復(fù)雜事物的人。當(dāng)機(jī)會出現(xiàn)的時(shí)候，你所要做的全部事情就是使用你平時(shí)謹(jǐn)慎耐心攢下來的彈藥、大手下注在那些勝算極大的賭局上。
84. The present era has no comparable referent in the past history of capitalism. We have a higher percentage of the intelligentsia engaged in buying and selling pieces of paper and promoting trading activity than in any past era. A lot of what I see now reminds me of Sodom and Gomorrah. You get activity feeding on itself, envy and imitation. It has happened in the past that there came bad consequences.
現(xiàn)在這個(gè)時(shí)代是以往的資本主義中沒見過的。與以往相比，我們有史上最多的知識分子投身在炒賣股票和投機(jī)倒把上。許多我所見到的事情讓我聯(lián)想起索多瑪和蛾摩拉（墮落罪惡之城）。自私、妒忌、還有各種山寨貨。以前也有過這些事情，它們導(dǎo)致了可怕的后果。
85. Our investment style has been given a name – focus investing – which implies ten holdings, not one hundred or four hundred. The idea that it is hard to find good investments, so concentrate in a few, seems to me to be an obvious idea. But 98% of the investment world does not think this way. It’s been good for us.
我們的投資風(fēng)格被稱作焦點(diǎn)投資，意在持有十只股票、而不是一百個(gè)或者四百個(gè)。好投資不好找，所以應(yīng)該集中在那些少數(shù)幾個(gè)好的上，這對于我是很顯而易見的事情。但是投資界98%的人都不這么想。這對我們倒是挺好的。
86. You want to be very careful with intense ideology. It presents a big danger for the only mind you’re ever going to get.”
你要當(dāng)心過于強(qiáng)烈的意識形態(tài)觀念。如果你腦子里只有一個(gè)念頭的話那是非常危險(xiǎn)的。
87. Like Warren, I had a considerable passion to get rich. “Not because I wanted Ferraris– I wanted the independence. I desperately wanted it.
和巴菲特一樣，我有很強(qiáng)的致富欲望。不是因?yàn)槲蚁矚g法拉利什么的，而是我喜歡獨(dú)立。我極度渴望獨(dú)立。
88. Anyone with an engineering frame of mind will look at [accounting standards] and want to throw up.
每一個(gè)有工程師思維的人看到會計(jì)準(zhǔn)則都會想吐。
89. You can progress only when you learn the method of learning.
你只有學(xué)會了如何學(xué)習(xí)才能進(jìn)步。
90. It’s a good habit to trumpet your failures and be quiet about your successes.
多談?wù)勀愕氖v程、少吹噓你的成功經(jīng)歷，這樣對你好。
91. In effect about half our spare cash was stashed in currencies other than the dollar. I consider that a non-event. As it happens it’s been a very profitable non-event.
實(shí)際效果上說，我們有一半的閑置現(xiàn)金是以美元以外的貨幣形式存儲的。我覺得這個(gè)不是什么大事兒。沒想到這件事情成了件很賺錢的小事兒。
92. As for what we like least, we don’t want kleptocracies. We need a rule of law. If people are stealing from the companies, we don’t need that.
我們最不喜歡的東西就是盜賊統(tǒng)治。我們需要法治。如果人們都從公司里盜取東西，我們不要這種公司。
93. I agree with Peter Drucker that the culture and legal systems of the United States are especially favorable to shareholder interests, compared to other interests and compared to most other countries. Indeed, there are many other countries where any good going to public shareholders has a very low priority and almost every other constituency stands higher in line.
我同意德魯克的觀點(diǎn)，他認(rèn)為美國相對其他國家而言是對公司股東最優(yōu)惠的國家。事實(shí)上，很多國家的上市公司股東權(quán)益是很沒優(yōu)先級的，需要讓位于各種其他人群的利益。
94. Berkshire in its history has made money betting on sure things.
伯克希爾的歷史就是在確定的事情上打賭的過程。
95. I don’t think there’s any business that we’ve bought that would have sold itself to a hedge fund. There’s a class of businesses that doesn’t want to deal with private-equity and hedge funds…thank God
我覺得我們買的公司都不會愿意把股份賣給對沖基金。有那么一類公司是不愿意應(yīng)付私募股權(quán)和對沖基金的，謝天謝地有這種公司。
96. We’re guessing at our future opportunity cost. Warren is guessing that he’ll have the opportunity to put capital out at high rates of return, so he’s not willing to put it out at less than 10% now. But if we knew interest rates would stay at 1%, we’d change. Our hurdles reflect our estimate of future opportunity costs.
我們在猜測未來的機(jī)會成本。巴菲特認(rèn)為將來有可能遇到很高回報(bào)的機(jī)會，所以他現(xiàn)在不會為10%回報(bào)的機(jī)會出手。但是如果我們知道利率一直保持在1%，我們會改變策略的。我們的倉位取決于我們對未來機(jī)會成本的預(yù)測。
97. Our ideas are so simple that people keep asking us for mysteries when all we have are the most elementary ideas.
我們的想法都是很簡單的，以至于人們總是希望我們能說點(diǎn)兒神秘的東西出來，但是我們的方法就是這么簡單。
98. The idea of a margin of safety, a Graham precept, will never be obsolete. The idea of making the market your servant will never be obsolete. The idea of being objective and dispassionate will never be obsolete. So Graham had a lot of wonderful ideas.
格雷厄姆的安全邊際理念、不讓市場主宰自己的理念、保持平常心的理念永遠(yuǎn)都不會過時(shí)。所以格雷厄姆有很多很好的理念。
99. Ben Graham could run his Geiger counter over this detritus from the collapse of the 1930s and find things selling below their working capital per share and so on….? But he was, by and large, operating when the world was in shell shock from the 1930s—which was the worst contraction in the English-speaking world in about 600 years. Wheat in Liverpool, I believe, got down to something like a 600-year low, adjusted for inflation. the classic Ben Graham concept is that gradually the world wised up and those real obvious bargains disappeared. You could run your Geiger counter over the rubble and it wouldn’t click. … Ben Graham followers responded by changing the calibration on their Geiger counters. In effect, they started defining a bargain in a different way. And they kept changing the definition so that they could keep doing what they’d always done. And it still worked pretty well.
格雷厄姆的方法就像是拿著探測器在30年代的廢墟里尋找寶貝，股價(jià)比每股現(xiàn)金還低的便宜股票。但總的來說，他工作的時(shí)代是全世界還陷在二戰(zhàn)戰(zhàn)后恐懼癥的時(shí)代，那是英語世界600年來通縮最嚴(yán)重的時(shí)代。利物浦的小麥價(jià)格跌到了600百年的最低值。經(jīng)典的格雷厄姆理念認(rèn)為世界會漸漸蘇醒過來，這些便宜會消失的。你拿著那時(shí)候的探測器在現(xiàn)在的廢墟里恐怕是找不到寶貝的。所以格雷厄姆的追隨者們就調(diào)整了探測器，他們開始用現(xiàn)代的方法來定義寶貝。他們一直在改進(jìn)探測器，來做自己擅長的事情，尋寶。直到現(xiàn)在，他們都還做得不錯(cuò)。
100. Warren and I don’t feel like we have any great advantage in the high-tech sector. In fact, we feel like we’re at a big disadvantage in trying to understand the nature of technical developments in software, computer chips or what have you. So we tend to avoid that stuff, based on our personal inadequacies. Again, that is a very, very powerful idea. Every person is going to have a circle of competence. And it’s going to be very hard to advance that circle. If I had to make my living as a musician…. I can’t even think of a level low enough to describe where I would be sorted out to if music were the measuring standard of the civilization.? So you have to figure out what your own aptitudes are. If you play games where other people have the aptitudes and you don’t, you’re going to lose. And that’s as close to certain as any prediction that you can make. You have to figure out where you’ve got an edge. And you’ve got to play within your own circle of competence.? If you want to be the best tennis player in the world, you may start out trying and soon find out that it’s hopeless—that other people blow right by you. However, if you want to become the best plumbing contractor in Bemidji, that is probably doable by two-thirds of you. It takes a will. It takes the intelligence. But after a while, you’d gradually know all about the plumbing business in Bemidji and master the art. That is an attainable objective, given enough discipline. And people who could never win a chess tournament or stand in center court in a respectable tennis tournament can rise quite high in life by slowly developing a circle of competence—which results partly from what they were born with and partly from what they slowly develop through work.
巴菲特和我在高科技領(lǐng)域都沒有什么優(yōu)勢。我們覺得讓我們?nèi)チ私廛浖?、芯片之類的東西我們討不著好。所以，基于這些不足，我們盡量避免這些東西。這又是一個(gè)很重要的思維。每個(gè)人都有自己的能力圈，而且這個(gè)能力圈很難增長。如果我要依靠音樂謀生的話我就完蛋了。所以你應(yīng)該想想自己的天資在什么地方。如果你在從事別人有天賦而你沒有的工作，你肯定是要輸?shù)摹]有意外。你要知道你的強(qiáng)項(xiàng)在什么地方，要在你的能力圈里面玩兒。如果你想做天下第一網(wǎng)球手，你可能很快發(fā)現(xiàn)自己沒戲，有人會迅速贏你好幾條街。但是如果你想做城關(guān)鎮(zhèn)的水管承包商，可能三分之二的人都能做到。這需要一個(gè)意向和一些智力投入。但是一段時(shí)間之后你就會慢慢了解城關(guān)鎮(zhèn)的水管行業(yè)并且漸漸掌握這門藝術(shù)了。這是一個(gè)可以達(dá)到的目標(biāo)，只要有足夠的付出。就是運(yùn)用一些與生俱來或者后天慢慢養(yǎng)成的能力圈，那些即使從來沒有贏過象棋比賽和網(wǎng)球比賽的人們也可以在生活中走向不小的成功。
101. Beta and modern portfolio theory and the like – none of it makes any sense to me.
"風(fēng)險(xiǎn)系數(shù)貝塔"和"現(xiàn)代投資組合理論"都一樣 --- 對于我來說完全是瞎搞。
102. Today, it seems to be regarded as the duty of CEOs to make the stock go up. This leads to all sorts of foolish behavior. We want to tell it like it is.
今天，保持股價(jià)似乎成了總裁們的任務(wù)之一，這引發(fā)了很多愚蠢的行為。我們這是實(shí)事求是。
103. Our standard prescription for the know-nothing investor with a long-term time horizon is a no-load index fund. I think that works better than relying on your stock broker. The people who are telling you to do something else are all being paid by commissions or fees. The result is that while index fund investing is becoming more and more popular, by and large it’s not the individual investors that are doing it. It’s the institutions.
對門外漢投資者們，我們的一貫標(biāo)準(zhǔn)建議都是購買免傭金的指數(shù)基金。我認(rèn)為這要比你的股票經(jīng)紀(jì)的建議更好。那些建議你購買其他金融產(chǎn)品的人往往都是借以收取傭金和費(fèi)用的。其結(jié)果就是越來越多的資金投放在指數(shù)基金上，而這里大部分都是機(jī)構(gòu)，而不是個(gè)人。（意即他們拿了你的錢去買指數(shù)基金，還收你手續(xù)費(fèi)和傭金。）
104. closet indexing….you’re paying a manager a fortune and he has 85% of his assets invested parallel to the indexes. If you have such a system, you’re being played for a sucker.
"黑箱追指數(shù)"投資法（一種大部分錢投資于指數(shù)成份股，小部分由基金經(jīng)理選股的投資組合，一般不公開策略，意在接近指數(shù)的表現(xiàn)）……你給經(jīng)理支付一大筆錢，而他把85%的錢照著指數(shù)成分投資。如果你是這么干的，你就被人當(dāng)傻子玩兒了。
105. Black-Scholes is a know-nothing system. If you know nothing about value — only price — then Black-Scholes is a pretty good guess at what a 90-day option might be worth. But the minute you get into longer periods of time, it’s crazy to get into Black-Scholes.
布萊克-舒爾斯模型（一種衍生品定價(jià)模型）是一種白癡模型。如果你對于標(biāo)的物的價(jià)值一無所知而只知道價(jià)格，那么這個(gè)模型對于90天的期權(quán)定價(jià)還是有價(jià)值的。但當(dāng)你要放眼于更長的時(shí)間的時(shí)候，使用這個(gè)模型就是瘋了。
106. Black-Scholes works for short-term options, but if it’s a long-term option and you think you know something [about the underlying asset], it’s insane to use Black-Scholes.
106，同105.
107. It’s hard to predict what will happen with two brands in a market.? Sometimes they will behave in a gentlemanly way, and sometimes they’ll pound each other.? I know of no way to predict whether they’ll compete moderately or to the death.? If you could figure it out, you could make a lot of money.
很難預(yù)測市場上兩個(gè)品牌間的競爭狀況。有時(shí)候他們會很君子般的競爭，有時(shí)候他們又會互相猛砍。我無法預(yù)測他們是會溫和共存還是血戰(zhàn)到底。如果你能預(yù)測得到，你就能賺很多錢。
108. We’ve really made the money out of high quality businesses. In some cases, we bought the whole business. And in some cases, we just bought a big block of stock. But when you analyze what happened, the big money’s been made in the high quality businesses. And most of the other people who’ve made a lot of money have done so in high quality businesses.
我們掙的錢都是從那些優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)中來的。有些是我們?nèi)Y收購的、有些是我們部分擁有的。但是當(dāng)你分析我們的情況時(shí)，大錢總是從優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)里來。其他人也是這樣，從優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)身上賺到錢。
109. A lot of share-buying, not bargain-seeking, is designed to prop stock prices up. Thirty to 40 years ago, it was very profitable to look at companies that were aggressively buying their own shares. They were motivated simply to buy below what it was worth.
現(xiàn)在很多股份回購的行為只是為了刺激股價(jià)而不是趁低吸收股權(quán)。三四十年前，如果你去尋找那些積極回購股票的公司，可以賺不少錢，因?yàn)樗麄兡菚r(shí)候都是因?yàn)楣蓛r(jià)低于價(jià)值才回購的，很純粹很簡單。
110. There are two kinds of businesses: The first earns 12%, and you can take it out at the end of the year. The second earns 12%, but all the excess cash must be reinvested — there’s never any cash. It reminds me of the guy who looks at all of his equipment and says, “There’s all of my profit.” We hate that kind of business.
有兩種生意：第一種每年掙12%，年底可以把錢拿回來；第二種每年掙12%，但是利潤必須重新投入運(yùn)營，永遠(yuǎn)也看不到現(xiàn)金。這讓我想到了一個(gè)家伙，他看著手里的一大堆（不能變現(xiàn)的）工具裝備，慨然嘆曰：“這就是我的全部利潤了?！?nbsp;我們可不喜歡這種生意。
111. There are actually businesses, that you will find a few times in a lifetime, where any manager could raise the return enormously just by raising prices—and yet they haven’t done it. So they have huge untapped pricing power that they’re not using. That is the ultimate no-brainer. … Disney found that it could raise those prices a lot and the attendance stayed right up.? So a lot of the great record of Eisner and Wells … came from just raising prices at Disneyland and Disneyworld and through video cassette sales of classic animated movies… At Berkshire Hathaway, Warren and I raised the prices of See’s Candy a little faster than others might have. And, of course, we invested in Coca-Cola—which had some untapped pricing power. And it also had brilliant management. So a Goizueta and Keough could do much more than raise prices. It was perfect.
有些生意你在人生中會見識幾次，這些生意里，隨便找個(gè)人當(dāng)經(jīng)理都能大幅提高利潤，只需要提高商品價(jià)格就行。但是他們又沒有這么做。所以他們有很多未開發(fā)的定價(jià)權(quán)。這些生意是最不需要?jiǎng)幽X子的。迪士尼發(fā)現(xiàn)他們不管怎么提價(jià)，入場率都是那么高。所以艾斯納和威爾斯（迪士尼CEO）的“杰出表現(xiàn)”很大部分來源于給迪士尼樂園門票提價(jià)或者給迪士尼的動畫提價(jià)。在我們這兒，巴菲特和我給喜詩糖果提價(jià)的速度比別人都更快一些。另外，當(dāng)然了，我們也投資了可口可樂，可口可樂也是有很多未開發(fā)的定價(jià)權(quán)的。而且可口可樂還有一個(gè)很棒的管理層，所以他們的CEO可以做許多提價(jià)以外的事情。這很完美。
112. At Berkshire Hathaway we do not like to compete against Chinese manufacturers.
我們伯克希爾不喜歡和中國生產(chǎn)企業(yè)競爭。
113. Berkshire is in the business of making easy predictions ?If a deal looks too hard, the partners simply shelve it.
伯克希爾的工作是做簡單的預(yù)測，如果一個(gè)交易太難搞懂，我們會把它擱置一邊。
114. We’re the tortoise that has outrun the hare because it chose the easy predictions.
我們是跑贏兔子的烏龜，因?yàn)槲覀兲裟切┖唵蔚氖虑閬眍A(yù)測。
115. Warren and I avoid doing anything that someone else at Berkshire can do better. You don’t really have a competency if you don’t know the edge of it.
巴菲特和我盡量不做那些公司內(nèi)有人比我們做得好的事情。如果你不知道你的能力圈的邊緣在哪兒，你等于沒有能力圈。
116. Understanding both the power of compound return and the difficulty of getting it is the heart and soul of understanding a lot of things.
理解復(fù)利的強(qiáng)大和難于達(dá)成，是理解很多事情的精髓。
117. Generally speaking, it can’t be good to be running a big current account deficit and a big fiscal deficit and have them both growing. You would be thinking the end there would be a comeuppance.” “[But] it isn’t as though all the other options look wonderful compared to the US. It gives me some feeling that what I regard as fiscal misbehavior on our part could go on some time without paying the price.
總的來說，美國同時(shí)持續(xù)增長的出超和財(cái)政赤字肯定不是什么好事兒，你會想到最后應(yīng)該會有個(gè)大報(bào)應(yīng)的。但是比起（投資在）美國，其他的選擇也不見得有多好。所以我的感覺是，雖然現(xiàn)在我們的財(cái)政不太靠譜，但一段時(shí)間內(nèi)繼續(xù)如此也暫時(shí)不會付出代價(jià)。
118. We started from such a strong position. It’s not as if the alternatives are all so great. I can understand why people would rather invest in the? U.S. Do you want to be in Europe, where 12-13% of people are unemployed and most 28-year-olds are living at home and being paid by state to do it? Or be in Brazil or Venezuela with the political instability that you fear? It’s not totally irrational that? people still like the U.S., despite its faults. Whatever misbehavior there is could go on quite a long time without a price being paid.
我們（美國）的底子很好。除了美國以外其他的選擇也不怎么樣。我可以理解為什么人們還是寧愿投資在美國。難道你想投到歐洲嗎？那兒的失業(yè)率高達(dá)12%、13%，大部分28歲的人都住在家里靠政府養(yǎng)著。難道你想投到巴西和委內(nèi)瑞拉？那兒的政局不穩(wěn)你整天得擔(dān)驚受怕。美國有這么多的錯(cuò)誤但是人們依然喜愛美國是有道理的。現(xiàn)在不靠譜的（財(cái)政策略）還可以繼續(xù)一段時(shí)間而不用付出代價(jià)。
119. Almost all good businesses engage in ‘pain today, gain tomorrow’ activities.
幾乎所有的好生意都是“今日付出，明日回報(bào)”類的。
120. No CEO examining books today understands what the hell is going on.
今天的總裁沒有能通過看報(bào)表搞明白發(fā)生什么事兒的。（意在諷刺現(xiàn)代財(cái)報(bào)的不科學(xué)）
121. Generally speaking, if you’re counting on outside directors to act [forcefully to protect your interests as a shareholder, then you’re crazy].? As a general rule in? America, boards act only if there’s been a severe disgrace. My friend Joe was asked to be on the board of Northwestern Bell and he jokes that ‘it was the last thing they ever asked me.’?I think you get better directors when you get directors who don’t need the money. ?When it’s half your income and all your retirement, you’re not likely to be very independent.? But when you have money and an existing reputation that you don’t want to lose, then you’ll act more independently.
一般而言，如果你指望外部董事采取行動或者有力地保護(hù)您作為股東的利益，那你這個(gè)想法就瘋了。作為一般規(guī)則？ 在美國，只有在出現(xiàn)嚴(yán)重的恥辱時(shí)，董事會才會采取行動。我的朋友喬被要求擔(dān)任西北貝爾公司的董事會成員，他開玩笑說：“這是他們問過我的最后一件事?！?？我認(rèn)為當(dāng)您找到不需要這些錢的董事時(shí)，您就會變得更好?！爱?dāng)收入和退休全部收入的一半時(shí)，您不太可能會非常獨(dú)立?！?nbsp;但是，當(dāng)您擁有金錢和不想失去的聲譽(yù)時(shí)，您將更加獨(dú)立。
122. If mutual fund directors are independent, then I’m the lead character in the Bolshoi Ballet.
如果共有基金的董事能夠做到獨(dú)立，那我就是莫斯科芭蕾舞團(tuán)的主跳。
123. Of course I’m troubled by huge consumer debt levels – we’ve pushed consumer credit very hard in the US.? Eventually, if it keeps growing, it will stop growing. As Herb Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”? When it stops, it may be unpleasant.? Other than Herb Stein’s quote, I have no comment.
我當(dāng)然對現(xiàn)在的巨大消費(fèi)債務(wù)感到擔(dān)憂。我們美國一直過于致力于推進(jìn)信用消費(fèi)了。如果他持續(xù)增長，總有一天會停止增長的。就像赫伯·斯坦恩說的“任何不能永遠(yuǎn)前進(jìn)的東西都會有停止的一刻?！?nbsp;當(dāng)信用消費(fèi)停止增長的時(shí)候，恐怕就不好過了。我完全同意斯坦恩的說法，別無評價(jià)。
124. I think it would be a great improvement if there were no D&O insurance . The counter-argument is that no-one with any money would serve on a board. But I think net net you’d be better off.
如果消滅“董事高管責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)”，我認(rèn)為是一大進(jìn)步。但反方的觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為那樣的話有錢人就都不愿意擔(dān)任董事了。但總的來說我認(rèn)為消滅它還是好的。
125. We don’t care about quarterly earnings (though obviously we care about how the business is doing over time) and are unwilling to manipulate in any way to make some quarter look better.
我們不在意單季度盈利（雖然我們關(guān)注一個(gè)企業(yè)長期表現(xiàn)如何），也很不愿意用任何方法修改報(bào)表以便某一季度的結(jié)果看上去更好。
126. What we don’t like in modern capitalism is the expectations game. It’s not the kissing cousin of evil; it’s the blood brother.
對于現(xiàn)代資本主義，我們不喜歡的部分是拼預(yù)測。這玩意兒特別邪惡。
127. There are a lot of things we pass on. We have three baskets: in, out, and too tough…We have to have a special insight, or we’ll put it in the ‘too tough’ basket. All of you have to look for a special area of competency and focus on that.
我們略過很多東西的。我們有三個(gè)籃子：留著的、要扔的、太難懂的。如果我們沒有特別看懂它的前景，我們就把它扔進(jìn)太難懂的那個(gè)籃子。你們要做的就是尋找一個(gè)你們特別有競爭力的領(lǐng)域并且專注于此。
128. We have a history when things are really horrible of wading in when no one else will.
我們曾經(jīng)在沒有任何人敢涉足的時(shí)候進(jìn)場（買進(jìn)）過。
129. We have monetized houses in this country in a way that’s never occurred before. Ask Joe how he bought a new Cadillac [and he’ll say] from borrowing on his house. We are awash in capital. [Being] awash is leading to very terrible behavior by credit cards and subprime lenders -a very dirty business, luring people into a disadvantageous position. It’s a new way of getting serfs, and it’s a dirty business. We have financial institutions, including those with big names, extending high-cost credit to the least able people. I find a lot of it revolting. Just because it’s a free market doesn’t mean it’s honorable.
我們當(dāng)今用房子套錢的方法以前從未出現(xiàn)過。你問張三他是怎么買的寶馬，他會告訴你是靠抵押房子貸的款。我們現(xiàn)在資本過剩。資本過剩會導(dǎo)致人們瘋狂刷信用卡和放債人發(fā)放次貸，發(fā)放次貸是一個(gè)骯臟的生意。它誘惑人們前往絕地。這是一種獲取奴隸的新方法，這是很臟的生意。我們有些金融機(jī)構(gòu)，包括那些大行，都在向那些弱勢群體發(fā)放次貸。我覺得這種行為令人厭惡。自由市場是自由的并不意味著它就是光榮的。
130. We don’t believe that markets are totally efficient and we don’t believe that widespread diversification will yield a good result.? We believe almost all good investments will involve relatively low diversification. Maybe 2% of people will come into our corner of the tent and the rest of the 98% will believe what they’ve been told.
我們不認(rèn)為市場是完全有效的，也不相信分散投資會帶來更好的結(jié)果。我們認(rèn)為最好的投資都是比較集中的。大概2%的人會跟我們站在同一個(gè)立場，其他的都還是相信他們所聽到的那些謬論。
131. Efficient market theory [is]? a wonderful economic doctrine that had a long vogue in spite of the experience of Berkshire Hathaway. In fact one of the economists who won — he shared a Nobel Prize — and as he looked at Berkshire Hathaway year after year, which people would throw in his face as saying maybe the market isn’t quite as efficient as you think, he said, “Well, it’s a two-sigma event.” And then he said we were a three-sigma event. And then he said we were a four-sigma event. And he finally got up to six sigmas — better to add a sigma than change a theory, just because the evidence comes in differently.And, of course, when this share of a Nobel Prize went into money management himself, he sank like a stone.
市場有效論是一個(gè)很好的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教條，流行了很長時(shí)間，但是跟我們伯克希爾的經(jīng)驗(yàn)相悖。事實(shí)上依靠此理論獲得諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)的其中一位經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家也觀察了我們公司好多年，人們當(dāng)他面質(zhì)問他，說市場恐怕不那么有效吧，不然怎么解釋伯克希爾的戰(zhàn)績，他就說我們是一個(gè)小概率的例子，有兩個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差。然后他又說我們這個(gè)例子有三個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差。然后又說我們四個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差。最后終于多到了六個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差。他寧愿給我們多弄幾個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差也不愿意修改他的理論。當(dāng)然了，最后當(dāng)他拿獲得的諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)金自己去投資的時(shí)候，錢就泥牛入海了。
132. I know just enough about? thermodynamics to understand that if it takes too much fossil-fuel energy to create ethanol, that’s a very stupid way to solve an energy problem.
我雖然懂的熱力學(xué)知識不多，但還是足以判斷這個(gè)事兒：如果你要花費(fèi)很多石油資源去生產(chǎn)乙醇，那么用乙醇替代石油就是一件很傻的節(jié)能方案。
133. It is entirely possible that you could use our mental models to find good IPOs to buy. There are countless IPOs every year, and I’m sure that there are a few cinches that you could jump on. But the average person is going to get creamed. So if you’re talented, good luck. IPOs are too small for us, or too high tech, so we won’t understand them. So, if Warren’s looking at them, I don’t know about it.
你用我們的思路去找靠譜的IPO來買是完全可能的。每年都有數(shù)不清的IPO，我相信肯定有一些是值得整一下的。但是大部分人都是被忽悠的。如果你很有才能，祝你好運(yùn)。對我們來說，IPO要么太小、要么太高科技所以我們搞不懂。如果巴菲特有在關(guān)注它們，我自己是不知道的。
（大道批注：我對剛剛IPO的公司也不感興趣，主要是沒足夠時(shí)間和資料去搞懂。）
134. Well envy/jealousy made, what, two out of the ten commandments? Those of you who have raised siblings you know about envy, or tried to run a law firm or investment bank or even a faculty? I’ve heard Warren say a half a dozen times, “It’s not greed that drives the world, but envy."
你看，妒忌和嫉妒，一個(gè)事兒占了十誡里的兩個(gè)位置。你們養(yǎng)過小孩兒們的、開律所的、管投行的、甚至當(dāng)系主任的，都知道妒忌是怎么回事兒。我聽巴菲特說過好多次：“帶領(lǐng)世界前進(jìn)的不是貪婪、而是妒忌的力量。”
135. Suppose, any one of you knew of a wonderful thing right now that you were overwhelmingly confident- and correctly so- would produce about 12% per annum compounded as far as you could see. Now, if you actually had that available, and by going into it you were forfeiting all opportunities to make money faster- there’re a lot of you who wouldn’t like that. But a lot of you would think, “What the hell do I care if somebody else makes money faster?” There’s always going to be somebody who is making money faster, running the mile faster or what have you. So in a human sense, once you get something that works fine in your life, the idea of caring terribly that somebody else is making money faster strikes me as insane.
假設(shè)一個(gè)場景，你知道有一個(gè)鐵板釘釘沒跑兒的機(jī)會可以帶來12%的復(fù)合年回報(bào)?，F(xiàn)在，假如這個(gè)機(jī)會放在你面前，但是要求你從此不再接受別的賺快錢的機(jī)會，你們中大部分人是不愿意干的。但你們中很多人也會說：“別人賺錢快為什么我要在意呢？” 這世界總有些人會賺錢比你快、跑得比你快、或者別的什么比你快。但是，從理智的角度來思考，一旦你自己找到了一件運(yùn)行良好的機(jī)制能致富，還非要在意別人賺錢比你快，這在我來看就是瘋了。
（大道批注：這里我看到兩點(diǎn)：1.平常心地呆在自己能力圈內(nèi)； 2. 12%是個(gè)可接受的年復(fù)合回報(bào)率。）
全文完結(jié)！
