(1)”Most people are too fretful, they worry too much.Success means being very patient, but aggressive when it’s time.” 看完這條可不要too aggressive哈。芒格本人曾經(jīng)就因?yàn)橛胢argin給自己帶來過大麻煩。我這個(gè)朋友也喜歡用margin，非常危險(xiǎn)。
1，大部分人都太浮躁、擔(dān)心得太多。成功需要非常平靜耐心，但是機(jī)會(huì)來臨的時(shí)候也要足夠進(jìn)取。
(2)”Using [a stock’s] volatility as a measure of risk is nuts. Risk to us is 1) the risk of permanent loss of capital, or 2) the risk of inadequate return. Some great businesses have very volatile returns – for example, See’s [a candy company owned
2，根據(jù)股票的波動(dòng)性來判斷風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是很傻的。我們認(rèn)為只有兩種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)：一，血本無歸；二，回報(bào)不足。有些很好的生意也是波動(dòng)性很大的，比如See's糖果通常一年有兩個(gè)季度都是虧錢的。反倒是有些爛透了的公司生意業(yè)績很穩(wěn)定。
(3)”I think that, every time you saw the word EBITDA [earnings], you should substitute the word “bullshit” earnings.”
3，所謂的“息稅折攤前利潤”就是狗屎。
(4)“Warren talks about these discounted cash flows. I’ve never seen him do one.”?”It’s true,” replied Buffett. “If the value of a company doesn’t just scream out at you, it’s too close.” 就是毛估估的意思？
4，巴菲特有時(shí)會(huì)提到“折現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流”，但是我從來沒見過他算這個(gè)。（巴菲特答曰“沒錯(cuò)，如果還要算才能得出的價(jià)值那就太不足恃了”）
(5)”If you buy something because it’s undervalued, then you have to think about selling it when it approaches your calculation of its intrinsic value. That’s hard. But if you buy a few great companies, then you can sit on your ass. That’s a good thing.” 這條大概要花很多年才能真明白，大概就是未來現(xiàn)金流折現(xiàn)的意思。我覺得自己現(xiàn)在大概有點(diǎn)明白了。
5，如果你買了一個(gè)價(jià)值低估的股票，你就要等到價(jià)格達(dá)到你算出來的內(nèi)在價(jià)值時(shí)賣掉，這是很難算的。但是如果你買了一個(gè)偉大的公司，你就坐那兒呆著就行了。
(6)”We bought a doomed textile mill [Berkshire Hathaway] and a California S&L [Wesco] just before a calamity. Both were bought at a discount to liquidation value.”
6，我們買過一個(gè)紡織廠（Berkshire Hathaway）和一個(gè)加州的存貸行（Wesco），這倆后來都帶來了災(zāi)難。但是我們買的時(shí)候，價(jià)格都比清算價(jià)值打折還低。
(7)”For society, the Internet is wonderful, but for capitalists, it will be a net negative. It will increase efficiency, but lots of things increase efficiency without increasing profits. It is way more likely to make American businesses less profitable than more profitable. This is perfectly obvious, but very little understood.” 我也這么認(rèn)為：internet 實(shí)際上是就業(yè)殺手，需要很多年才能消化。但是，如果能看懂這個(gè)變化則會(huì)非常有收獲。
7，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)對(duì)于社會(huì)是極為美好的，但是對(duì)于資本家來說純屬禍害?；ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)能提高效率，但是有很多東西都是提高效率卻降低利潤的?；ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)會(huì)讓美國的企業(yè)少賺錢而不是多賺錢。
(8)”Virtually every investment expert’s public assessment is that he is above average, no matter what is the evidence to the contrary.” 這可是芒格說的哈。
8，市面上對(duì)每個(gè)投資專家的評(píng)價(jià)都是高于平均的，不管有多少證據(jù)證明其實(shí)根本不是那回事兒。
(9)”Investing is where you find a few great companies and then sit on your ass.”
9，同第5條。
(10)”Warren spends 70 hours a week thinking about investing.”
10，巴菲特每個(gè)禮拜有70個(gè)小時(shí)花在思考投資上。
(11)”People calculate too much and think too little.” 投資上看起來確實(shí)如此。
11，人們算得太多、想得太少。
(12)”Whenever you think something or some person is ruining your life, it’s you. A victimization mentality is so debilitating.”
12，無論何時(shí)，如果你覺得有東西在摧毀你的生活，那個(gè)東西就是你自己。老覺得自己是受害者的想法是最削弱自己的利器。
(13)”The tax code gives you an enormous advantage if you can find some things you can just sit with.” 對(duì)美國人尤其如此，外國人投美股有點(diǎn)不同
13，稅法決定了，還是買個(gè)偉大公司傻等它飛起來最劃算。
(14)”If you’re going to buy something which compounds for 30 years at 15% per annum and you pay one 35% tax at the very end, the way that works out is that after taxes, you keep 13.3% per annum. In contrast, if you bought the same investment, but had to pay taxes every year of 35% out of the 15% that you earned, then your return would be 15% minus 35% of 15%—or only 9.75% per year compounded. So the difference there is over 3.5%. And what 3.5% does to the numbers over long holding periods like 30 years is truly eye-opening…” 同上句。
14，如果你買的股票每年復(fù)利回報(bào)15%，持續(xù)30年，而你最后一次性賣掉的時(shí)候交35%的稅，那你的年回報(bào)還有13.3%。反之，對(duì)于同一支股票，如果你每年都賣一次交一次稅，那你的年回報(bào)就只有9.75%。這個(gè)3.5%的差距放大到30年是讓人大開眼界的。
(15)”The number one idea, is to view a stock as an ownership of the business [and] to judge the staying quality of the business in terms of its competitive advantage. Look for more value in terms of discounted future cash flow than you’re paying for. Move only when you have an advantage. It’s very basic. You have to understand the odds and have the discipline to bet only when the odds are in your favor.” 很稀飯這句。
15，最重要的，是要把股票看作對(duì)于企業(yè)的一小片所有權(quán)，以企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭優(yōu)勢(shì)來判斷內(nèi)在的價(jià)值。要尋找未來折現(xiàn)的現(xiàn)金利潤比你支付的股價(jià)高的機(jī)會(huì)。這是很基礎(chǔ)的，你得明白概率，只有當(dāng)你贏的概率更大的時(shí)候才去下賭注。
(16)”Failure to handle psychological denial is a common way for people to go broke. You’ve made an enormous commitment to something.You’ve poured effort and money in. And the more you put in, the more that the whole consistency principle makes you think,” Now it has to work. If I put in just a little more, then it ’all work…. People go broke that way —because they can ’t stop,rethink,and say,’ I can afford to write this one off and live to fight again. I don’t have to pursue this thing as an obsession —in a way that will break me .’ “ 想起沉入成本。還想起老巴說的，如果是個(gè)坑就別再往下挖了?？纯从卸嗌偃嗽诮o自己挖坑就明白了。
16，人們破產(chǎn)的常見原因是不能控制心理上的糾結(jié)。你花了這么多心血、這么多金錢，花的越多，就越容易這么想：“估計(jì)快成了，再多花一點(diǎn)兒，就能成了……” 人們就是這么破產(chǎn)的----因?yàn)樗麄儾豢贤Ｏ聛硐胂耄骸爸巴度氲木退銢]了唄，我承受得起，我還可以重新振作。我不需要為這件事情沉迷不誤，這可能會(huì)毀了我的?！?br>(17)”…in terms of business mistakes that I’ve seen over a long lifetime, I would say that trying to minimize taxes too much is one of the great standard causes of really dumb mistakes. I see terrible mistakes from people being overly motivated by tax considerations. Warren and I personally don’t drill oil wells. We pay our taxes. And we’ve done pretty well, so far. Anytime somebody offers you a tax shelter from here on in life, my advice would be don’t buy it.” 讓我想起那些為避稅而搬離加州的有錢的朋友們，為了省那些未來不屬于自己的錢而搬到一個(gè)自己未必喜歡的地方好像有點(diǎn)滑稽。當(dāng)然，搬過去后又喜歡上了那是有智慧的表現(xiàn)啊，至少我還沒聽說哪位搬家后說新地方不好的。
17，說到我這輩子在生意中見過的錯(cuò)誤，過度追求避稅是一個(gè)常見的讓人做傻事兒的原因。我看到有人為了避稅干很大的錯(cuò)事。巴菲特和我雖然不是挖石油的，但是我們?cè)摻坏亩惗冀?，我們現(xiàn)在也過得挺好的。要是有人向你兜售避稅套餐，別買。
(18)”I believe that we are at or near the apex of a great civilization….In 50-100 years, if we’re a poor third to some countries in Asia, I wouldn’t be surprised. If I had to bet, the part of the world that will do best will be Asia.” 或許50-100年也許稍微短了一點(diǎn)。
18，我認(rèn)為我們（美國）正處于或者接近我們文明的頂點(diǎn)……如果50或者100年后，我們（美國）只比得上亞洲某國家的的三分之一，我一點(diǎn)兒也不會(huì)覺得奇怪。如果要賭，這世界上將來干得最棒的應(yīng)該是亞洲。
(19)”To some extent, stocks are like Rembrandts. They sell based on what they’ve sold in the past. Bonds are much more rational. No-one thinks a bond’s value will soar to the moon.” “Imagine if every pension fund in America bought Rembrandts. Their value would go up and they would create their own constituency.”
19，某些程度上，股票就像是倫勃朗的畫。它們的價(jià)格基于過去成交的價(jià)格。債券要理性得多。沒有人會(huì)認(rèn)為債券的價(jià)格會(huì)高到天上去。想象一下如果美國的所有退休基金都去買倫勃朗的油畫，它們都會(huì)升值并且引來一幫追隨者。
(20)”It’s crazy to assume that what’s happening in Argentina and Japan is inconceivable here.”
20，有人認(rèn)為阿根廷和日本發(fā)生的事情在咱們這里（美國）絕對(duì)不會(huì)發(fā)生，這種想法是很瘋狂的。
(21)”REITs are way more suitable for individual shareholders than for corporate shareholders. And Warren has enough residue from his old cigar-butt personality that when people became disenchanted with the REITs and the market price went down to maybe a 20% discount from what the companies could be liquidated for, he bought a few shares with his personal money. So it’s nice that Warren has a few private assets with which to pick up cigar butts in memory of old times – if that’s what keeps him amused.”
21，比起機(jī)構(gòu)投資者，房產(chǎn)投資信托（REIT）更適合個(gè)人投資者。巴菲特還留著一些煙頭性格（意指其早期偏重格雷厄姆式的投資價(jià)值低估企業(yè)的風(fēng)格），這讓他愿意在人們不喜歡房產(chǎn)投資信托并且市價(jià)跌出八折以內(nèi)的時(shí)候，用自己的私房錢買點(diǎn)兒REIT。這種行為能讓他回憶起當(dāng)年撿煙頭的快樂，所以他自己有點(diǎn)兒閑錢鼓搗這事兒也挺好的。
(22)”Smart people aren’t exempt from professional disasters from overconfidence. Often, they just run aground in the more difficult voyages they choose, relying on their self-appraisals that they have superior talents and methods.”
22，聰明人也不免遭受過度自信帶來的災(zāi)難。他們認(rèn)為自己有更強(qiáng)的能力和更好的方法，所以往往他們就在更艱難的道路上疲于奔命。
(23))”The whole concept of the house advantage is an interesting one in modern money management. The terms of the managers of the private partnerships look a lot like the take of the croupier at Monte Carlo, only greater.”
23，“莊$家優(yōu)勢(shì)”是個(gè)在現(xiàn)代理財(cái)學(xué)里很有意思的概念。那些機(jī)構(gòu)的基金經(jīng)理看上去很像是賭場(chǎng)里的總管，只是規(guī)模更大。（翻譯不知道準(zhǔn)不準(zhǔn)確，希望達(dá)人糾正）
(24)”There are always people who will be better at some thing than you are.You have to learn to be a follower before you become a leader.”
24，三人行必有我?guī)?，要成為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者之前必須先做跟隨者。
(25)”We all are learning, modifying, or destroying ideas all the time. Rapid destruction of your ideas when the time is right is one of the most valuable qualities you can acquire. You must force yourself to consider arguments on the other side. If you can’t state arguments against what you believe better than your detractors, you don’t know enough.”
25，我們總是在學(xué)習(xí)、修正、甚至顛覆各種主意。在恰當(dāng)時(shí)機(jī)下快速顛覆你的想法是一項(xiàng)很重要的品質(zhì)。你要強(qiáng)迫自己去考慮對(duì)立的觀點(diǎn)。如果你不能比你的對(duì)手更好地說服對(duì)方，那說明你的理解還不夠。
(26)“I remember the $0.05 hamburger and a $0.40-per-hour minimum wage, so I’ve seen a tremendous amount of inflation in my lifetime. Did it ruin the investment climate? I think not.”
26，我以前那個(gè)年代，漢堡包5美分一個(gè)、最低時(shí)薪是40美分，所以我算是見證了巨大的通脹了。但它摧毀了投資環(huán)境嗎？我不這么認(rèn)為。
(27)”A lot of success in life and business comes from knowing what you want to avoid: early death, a bad marriage, etc.” 就是堅(jiān)持不做不對(duì)的事情的意思。
27，大部分生活和事業(yè)上的成功來自于有意避免了一些東西：早死、錯(cuò)誤的婚姻、等等。
(28)”There are two types of mistakes: 1) doing nothing[We saw it, but didn’t act on it]; what Warren calls “sucking my thumb” and 2) buying with an eyedropper things we should be buying a lot of.”
28，有兩種錯(cuò)誤：一，什么都不做（看到了機(jī)會(huì)卻束之高閣），巴菲特說這個(gè)叫做“吮指之錯(cuò)”；二，本來該一堆一堆地買的東西，我們卻只買了一眼藥水瓶的量。
(29)”Checklist routines avoid a lot of errors. You should have all of this elementary wisdom, and you should go through a mental checklist in order to use it. There is no other procedure that will work as well.” 還是堅(jiān)持不做不對(duì)的事情的意思。
29，經(jīng)常對(duì)照一下清單可以避免錯(cuò)誤。你們應(yīng)該掌握這些基礎(chǔ)的智慧。對(duì)照清單之前還要過一遍心理清單（意指平常心），這個(gè)方法是無可替代的。
(30)”Litigation is notoriously time-consuming, inefficient, costly and unpredictable.”
30，打官司是出了名的費(fèi)時(shí)、費(fèi)力、低效、以及難料結(jié)果。
(31)”Finding a single investment that will return 20% per year for 40 years tends to happen only in dreamland. In the real world, you uncover an opportunity, and then you compare other opportunities with that. And you only invest in the most attractive opportunities. That’s your opportunity cost. That’s what you learn in freshman economics. The game hasn’t changed at all. That’s why Modern Portfolio Theory is so asinine.” 這游戲沒變過，在哪里都一樣。
31，連續(xù)40年每年回報(bào)20%的投資只存在于夢(mèng)想之國。現(xiàn)實(shí)世界中，你得尋找機(jī)會(huì)，然后和其他機(jī)會(huì)對(duì)比，最后只找最吸引人的機(jī)會(huì)投資進(jìn)去。這就是你的機(jī)會(huì)成本，這是你大一經(jīng)濟(jì)課上就學(xué)到的。游戲并沒有發(fā)生什么變化，所以所謂的“現(xiàn)代投資組合”理論非常愚蠢。
(32)”The more hard lessons you can learn vicariously rather than through your own hard experience, the better.”
“Well, some of our success we predicted and some of it was fortuitous.”
32，最好是從別人的悲慘經(jīng)歷中學(xué)到深刻教訓(xùn)，而不是自己的。我們有些成功是早就預(yù)言的，有些是意外獲得的。
(33)”The general assumption is that it must be easy to sit behind a desk and people will bring in one good opportunity after another — this was the attitude in venture capital until a few years ago. This was not the case at all for us — we scrounged around for companies to buy. For 20 years, we didn’t buy more than one or two per year. …It’s fair to say that we were rooting around. There were no commissioned salesmen. Anytime you sit there waiting for a deal to come by, you’re in a very dangerous seat.” 這個(gè)有點(diǎn)累。
33，一般認(rèn)為，最好的情形就是你坐在辦公室里，然后美好的投資機(jī)會(huì)一個(gè)接一個(gè)地被送到你的面前 ---- 直到幾年之前，風(fēng)投界的人們就是這樣享受的。但是我們完全不是這樣 ---- 我們就跟要飯的似的到處尋找好公司來買。20年來，我們每年最多投資一到兩個(gè)公司…… 說我們已經(jīng)挖地三尺了都不夸張。（好機(jī)會(huì)）是沒有專業(yè)推銷員的。如果你坐在那里等待好機(jī)會(huì)來臨，那你的座兒很危險(xiǎn)。
(34)”O(jiān)ur biggest mistakes, were things we didn’t do, companies we didn’t buy.”
34，我們最大的錯(cuò)誤是該做的沒做、該買的沒買。
(35)”You can progress only when you learn the method of learning.”
35，你只有學(xué)會(huì)怎么學(xué)習(xí)你才會(huì)進(jìn)步。
(36)”It is remarkable how much long-term advantage people like us have gotten by trying to be consistently not stupid, instead of trying to be very intelligent.” 小聰明和大智慧的差別，也是堅(jiān)持不做不對(duì)的事情的意思。
36，我們長期努力保持不做傻事，所以我們的收獲比那些努力做聰明事的人要多得多。
(37)”Berkshire’s past record has been almost ridiculous. If Berkshire had used even half the leverage of, say, Rupert Murdoch, it would be five times its current size.” 經(jīng)常有很多人用很多margin，然后去和BRK比某年的回報(bào)，但沒多少人可以把30年的總回報(bào)拿來比的，30年以后可能還是如此。
37，BRK的過去業(yè)績簡直輝煌得離譜。如果我們也用杠桿，哪怕比默多克用的少一半，也會(huì)比現(xiàn)在的規(guī)模大五倍。
(38)”It took us months of buying all the Coke stock we could to accumulate $1 billion worth — equal to 7% of the company. It’s very hard to accumulate major positions.”
38，買可口可樂股票的時(shí)候我們花了幾個(gè)月才攢了10億美元的股票 --- 是可口可樂總市值的7%。要攢成主要股東是很難的。
(39)”All large aggregations of capital eventually find it hell on earth to grow and thus find a lower rate of return”
39，所有的大資本最終都會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)很難擴(kuò)大，于是去尋找一些回報(bào)率更低的途徑。
(40)”If you have only a little capital and are young today, there are fewer opportunities than when I was young. Back then, we had just come out of a depression. Capitalism was a bad word. There had been abuses in the 1920s. A joke going around then was the guy who said, ‘I bought stock for my old age and it worked — in six months, I feel like an old man!’ “It’s tougher for you, but that doesn’t mean you won’t do well — it just may take more time. But what the heck, you may live longer.”
40，如果今天你的資本較少并且年輕，你的機(jī)會(huì)比我們那時(shí)候要少。我們年輕的時(shí)候剛走出大蕭條，資本主義那時(shí)候是一個(gè)貶義詞，在20年代對(duì)資本主義的批判更是肆虐。那時(shí)候流行一個(gè)笑話：有個(gè)人說“我買股票是為老了的時(shí)候考慮，沒想到六個(gè)月就用上了！我現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)覺得自己是老人了?！蹦銈兊沫h(huán)境更加艱難，但并不意味著你們做不好 --- 只是要多花些時(shí)間。但是去他娘的，你們還可能活的更長呢。
(41)”Regarding the demographic trend called Baby Boomers, it’s peanuts compared to the trend of economic growth.? Over the last century, [our] GNP is up seven times.? This was not caused by Baby Boomers, but by the general success of capitalism and the march of technology.? Those trends were so favorable that little blips in the birth rate were not that significant.??We can keep social peace as long as GNP rises 3% annually – this can pay for spending by politicians.? If we ever got to stasis [no growth], then with all the promises, you’d get real tensions between the generations.? The Baby Boomers would exacerbate it, but the real cause would be lack of growth.”
41，關(guān)于所謂“嬰兒潮（美國5、60年代出生）”的人口學(xué)現(xiàn)象，其影響相對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的影響來說小很多。過去的一個(gè)世紀(jì)，美國的GNP（國民生產(chǎn)總值）增長了7倍。這不是嬰兒潮導(dǎo)致的，而是由美國資本主義的成功和技術(shù)的發(fā)展帶來的。這兩樣?xùn)|西的影響太利好，嬰兒潮問題相比之下就是一個(gè)小波動(dòng)。只要美國的GNP每年增長3%，就能保持社會(huì)和平 --- 足以覆蓋政客們的花銷。如果美國的發(fā)展停滯了，我敢保證，你們將會(huì)見證真切的代溝，不同代的人之間關(guān)系會(huì)很緊張。嬰兒潮是這種緊張的催化劑，但是根本原因還是經(jīng)濟(jì)不增長。
(42)”Practically everybody overweighs the stuff that can be numbered, because it yields to the statistical techniques they’re taught in academia, and doesn’t mix in the hard-to-measure stuff that may be more important. That is a mistake I’ve tried all my life to avoid, and I have no regrets for having done that.”
42，實(shí)際上，每個(gè)人都會(huì)把可以量化的東西看得過重，因?yàn)樗麄兿搿鞍l(fā)揚(yáng)”自己在學(xué)校里面學(xué)的統(tǒng)計(jì)技巧，于是忽略了那些雖然無法量化但是更加重要的東西。我一生都致力于避免這種錯(cuò)誤，我覺得我這么干挺不錯(cuò)的。
(43)”You must know the big ideas in the big disciplines, and use them routinely — all of them, not just a few. Most people are trained in one model — economics, for example — and try to solve all problems in one way. You know the old saying: to the man with a hammer, the world looks like a nail. This is a dumb way of handling problems.”
43，你應(yīng)該對(duì)各種學(xué)科的各種思維都有所理解，并且經(jīng)常使用它們 --- 它們的全部，而不是某幾個(gè)。大部分人都熟練于使用某一個(gè)單一的模型，比如經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)模型，去解決所有的問題。應(yīng)了一句老話：“拿錘子的木匠，看書上的字兒就覺著像釘子。” 這是一種很白癡的做事方法。
(44)”The whole concept of dividing it up into ‘value’ and ‘growth’ strikes me as twaddle. It’s convenient for a bunch of pension fund consultants to get fees prattling about and a way for one advisor to distinguish himself from another. But, to me, all intelligent investing is value investing.”
44，對(duì)于我而言，把股票分成“價(jià)值股”和“成長股”就是瞎搞。這種分法可以讓基金經(jīng)理們借以夸夸其談、也可以讓分析師們給自己貼個(gè)標(biāo)簽，但是在我眼中，所有靠譜的投資都是價(jià)值投資。
(45)”In my whole life, I have known no wise people who didn’t read all the time – none, zero. You’d be amazed at how much Warren reads, at how much I read. My children laugh at me. They think I’m a book with a couple of legs sticking out.”
45，我這一輩子認(rèn)識(shí)的所有智者，沒有不愛看書的。我和巴菲特看書之多都能嚇著你。我的孩子取笑我說我就是一本抻出兩條腿的書。
(46)”We read a lot.? I don’t know anyone who’s wise who doesn’t read a lot.? But that’s not enough: You have to have a temperament to grab ideas and do sensible things.? Most people don’t grab the right ideas or don’t know what to do with them.”
46，我們都愛大量閱讀，聰明人都這樣，但這還不夠，你還應(yīng)該有一種批判接受、合理應(yīng)用的態(tài)度。大部分人看書都沒有抓到正確的重點(diǎn)，看完了又不會(huì)學(xué)以致用。
(47)”We get these questions a lot from the enterprising young. It’s a very intelligent question: You look at some old guy who’s rich and you ask, ‘How can I become like you, except faster?”
47，我們經(jīng)常從那些上進(jìn)的孩子們那兒聽到這些問題。這是個(gè)很“聰明”的問題，你對(duì)著一個(gè)有錢老頭問：“我怎么才能成為你呢？怎么才能迅速地成為你呢？
(48)”It takes almost no capital to open a new See’s candy store. We’re drowning in capital of our own that has almost no cost. It would be crazy to franchise stores like some capital-starved pancake house. We like owning our own stores as a matter of quality control”
48，我們?nèi)绻匍_一家See's糖果幾乎不用花費(fèi)任何資本。我們的資本太多了都快淹死我們了，所以幾乎是零成本。對(duì)于有些極度缺錢的煎餅店，增設(shè)特許經(jīng)營店簡直是瘋狂的事情。我們喜歡搞直營店以便更好地控制服務(wù)品質(zhì)。
(49)”It’s dangerous to short stocks.”
49，做空行為是很危險(xiǎn)的。
(50)”Being short and seeing a promoter take the stock up is very irritating. It’s not worth it to have that much irritation in your life.”
50，坐在空頭位置，又看到股價(jià)遇到利好大漲，這是一件特別讓人氣憤的事情。人生苦短，遭受這種氣憤太不值當(dāng)了。
(51)”It would be one of the most irritating experiences in the world to do a lot of work to uncover a fraud and then at have it go from X to 3X and and have the crooks happily partying with your money while you’re meeting margin calls. Why would you want to go within hailing distance of that?”
51，世界上最郁悶的事情之一，就是你費(fèi)盡力氣發(fā)現(xiàn)了一個(gè)騙局（并且做空這個(gè)公司），但是眼睜睜地看著股價(jià)繼續(xù)瘋漲三倍，而且這些騙子們拿著你的錢彈冠相慶，而且你還要收到證券行的保證金追加通知。像這種郁悶的事情你哪能去碰呢？
(52)”…the cost of being a publicly traded stock has gone way, way up. It doesn’t make sense for a little company to be public anymore. A lot of little companies are going private to be rid of these burdensome requirements….”?
52，上市的代價(jià)已經(jīng)變得非常高了。一個(gè)小公司謀求上市是沒有什么道理的。很多小公司正在走私有化的路子以此擺脫上市公司的繁冗負(fù)擔(dān)。
(53)”Well the open-outcry auction is just made to turn the brain into mush: you’ve got social proof, the other guy is bidding, you get reciprocation tendency, you get deprival super-reaction syndrome, the thing is going away… I mean it just absolutely is designed to manipulate people into idiotic behavior.”
53，公開叫價(jià)的競(jìng)價(jià)方式就是設(shè)計(jì)來讓人的腦子變成一鍋粥的：由于別人也在叫價(jià)，你覺得（你的競(jìng)價(jià)）得到了社會(huì)認(rèn)同，你會(huì)有一種回饋傾向，會(huì)陷入一種“被剝奪超級(jí)反應(yīng)綜合癥”，覺得（必須想方設(shè)法阻止）你的“心頭好”離你而去……總之我的意思就是這種方式就是設(shè)計(jì)來操縱人的心理的，讓人們?nèi)プ霭装V的事情。
(54)”The problem with closed bid auctions is that they are frequently won by people making a technical mistake, as in the case with Shell paying double for Belridge Oil. You can’t pay double the losing bid in an open outcry auction.”
54，暗標(biāo)競(jìng)價(jià)的問題在于標(biāo)的物常常被那些犯了技術(shù)錯(cuò)誤的一方贏得，比如殼牌石油支付給貝利奇石油的價(jià)格是（另一方的）兩倍。在公開叫價(jià)的競(jìng)標(biāo)中，你就不可能比輸?shù)舻哪且环蕉喔兑槐兜膬r(jià)錢。
(55)”We’re partial to putting out large amounts of money where we won’t have to make another decision.”
55，我們偏愛把大量的金錢投放到那些不需要我們?cè)僮鍪裁雌渌麤Q策的地方。
(56)”Understanding how to be a good investor makes you a better business manager and vice versa.”
56，能理解投資的真髓也能讓你成為一個(gè)好的企業(yè)管理者，反之亦然。
(57)”What’s fascinating . . .is that you could now have a business that might have been selling for $10 billion where the business itself could probably not have borrowed even $100 million. But the owners of that business, because its public, could borrow many billions of dollars on their little pieces of paper- because they had these market valuations. But as a private business, the company itself couldn’t borrow even 1/20th of what the individuals could borrow.”
57，有件事情很有意思：你可能擁有一家價(jià)值100億美元的公司，而這家公司可能連1億美元都借不到。但是，由于公司是上市公司，公司的大股東憑著手里的小紙片（股票）做擔(dān)保卻能借到好幾十億美元。但是如果公司不是上市的，它可能連那些大股東能借到的20分之一的錢都借不到。
(58)”I constantly see people rise in life who are not the smartest – sometimes not even the most diligent. But they are learning machines; they go to bed every night a little wiser than when they got up. And, boy, does that habit help, particularly when you have a long run ahead of you.”
58，我經(jīng)常見到一些并不聰明的人成功，他們甚至也并不十分勤奮。但是他們都是一些熱愛學(xué)習(xí)的“學(xué)習(xí)機(jī)器”；他們每天晚上睡覺的時(shí)候都比那天早上起床的時(shí)候稍微多了那么一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)智慧。伙計(jì)，如果你前面有很長的路要走的話，這可是大有裨益的啊。
(59)”The basic concept of value to a private owner and being motivated when you’re buying and selling securities by reference to intrinsic value instead of price momentum – I don’t think that will ever be outdated.”
59，不管是對(duì)于私有企業(yè)的企業(yè)主還是上市公司的股東，進(jìn)行買賣時(shí)參考的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)該是企業(yè)內(nèi)在價(jià)值而不是過往成交的紀(jì)錄，這是最基本的價(jià)值概念，而且我認(rèn)為永遠(yuǎn)也不會(huì)過時(shí)。
(60)”Warren and I have not made our way in life by making successful macroeconomic predictions and betting on our conclusions.”
60，巴菲特和我不是因?yàn)槌晒︻A(yù)測(cè)了宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)并且依此下注才獲得今天的成功的。
(61)”Well, the questioner came from Singapore which has perhaps the best economic record in the history of any developing economy and therefore he referred to 15% per annum as modest. It’s not modest–it’s arrogant. Only someone from Singapore would call it modest.”
61，提問者來自新加坡，新加坡可能是世界歷史上成績最輝煌的發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)，所以這位提問者才會(huì)把15%的增長率稱作“保守”。但其實(shí)這不是“保守”，這是很狂妄的。只有新加坡來的人才敢把15%稱作“保守”。
(62)”I don’t spend much time, regretting the past, once I’ve taken my lesson from it. I don’t dwell on it.”
62，我不會(huì)花太多時(shí)間追悔過去，一旦吸取了教訓(xùn)，我就不會(huì)再陷在里面了。
(63)”If you took our top fifteen decisions out, we’d have a pretty average record. It wasn’t hyperactivity, but a hell of a lot of patience. You stuck to your principles and when opportunities came along, you pounce on them with vigor.”
63，如果你從我們的投資決策里剔除掉最好的那15個(gè)，我們的表現(xiàn)就顯得非常平庸了。（游戲的重點(diǎn)）不是非常多的動(dòng)作而是非常大的耐心。你要堅(jiān)守你的原則，當(dāng)機(jī)會(huì)出現(xiàn)的時(shí)候，就大力出擊。
(64)”We just throw some decisions into the ‘too hard’ file and go onto the others.”
我們會(huì)把一些決策議題扔進(jìn)名字叫做“太難了”的檔案柜，然后去看其他的議題。
(65)”Forgetting your mistakes is a terrible error if you are trying to improve your cognition.”
65，如果想提高你的認(rèn)知能力，忘記過去犯過的錯(cuò)誤是堅(jiān)決不行的。
(66)”In the 1930s, there as a stretch here you could borrow more against the real estate than you could sell it for. I think that’s what’s going on in today’s private-equity world”
66，30年代的時(shí)候，靠房產(chǎn)抵押得到的貸款可以比房子的售價(jià)更多。這大概就是現(xiàn)在私募股權(quán)領(lǐng)域的情形。
(67)”Mimicking the herd invites regression to the mean.”
67，模仿一大堆人意味著接近他們的平均水平。
(68)”A lot of opportunities in life tend to last a short while, due to some temporary inefficiency… For each of us, really good investment opportunities aren’t going to come along too often and won’t last too long, so you’ve got to be ready to act and have a prepared mind.”
68，生命中的很多機(jī)遇都只會(huì)持續(xù)一小段時(shí)間，它們持續(xù)是因?yàn)椋▌e人）暫時(shí)不便（攫取它）……對(duì)于我們每個(gè)人，機(jī)不可失時(shí)不再來，所以你最好隨時(shí)預(yù)備好行動(dòng)并且有足夠的思想準(zhǔn)備。
(69)”Everywhere there is a large commission, there is a high probability of a ripoff.”
69，有巨額傭金的地方常常就有騙局。
(70)”Acknowledging what you don’t know is the dawning of wisdom.”
70，承認(rèn)自己不懂某樣?xùn)|西意味著智慧的曙光即將來臨。
(71)”Recognize reality even when you don’t like it – especially when you don’t like it.”
71，即使你不喜歡現(xiàn)實(shí)，也要承認(rèn)現(xiàn)實(shí) --- 其實(shí)越是你不喜歡，你越應(yīng)該承認(rèn)現(xiàn)實(shí)。
(72)”We try more to profit from always remembering the obvious than from grasping the esoteric.”
72，我們努力做到通過牢記常識(shí)而不是通過知曉尖端知識(shí)賺錢。
(73)?“Over the long term, it’s hard for a stock to earn a much better return that the business which underlies it earns. If the business earns six percent on capital over forty years and you hold it for that forty years, you’re not going to make much different than a six percent return – even if you originally buy it at a huge discount. Conversely, if a business earns eighteen percent on capital over twenty or thirty years, even if you pay an expensive looking price, you’ll end up with one hell of a result.”
73，長期而言，一個(gè)公司股票的盈利很難比這個(gè)公司的盈利多。如果公司每年賺6%持續(xù)40年，你最后的年化回報(bào)也就是6%左右，即使你買的時(shí)候股票有很大的折扣。但反過來如果公司每年資產(chǎn)收益率達(dá)18%并且持續(xù)二三十年，即使你買的時(shí)候看起來很貴，他還是會(huì)給你帶來驚喜。
(74)”Just as a man working with his tools should know its limitations, a man working with his cognitive apparatus must know its limitations.”
74，就像工人必須了解自己工具的局限性，用腦子吃飯的人也要知道自己腦子的局限性。
(75)”Many markets get down to two or three big competitors—or five or six. And in some of those markets, nobody makes any money to speak of. But in others, everybody does very well.? Over the years, we’ve tried to figure out why the competition in some markets gets sort of rational from the investor’s point of view so that the shareholders do well, and in other markets, there’s destructive competition that destroys shareholder wealth.? If it’s a pure commodity like airline seats, you can understand why no one makes any money. As we sit here, just think of what airlines have given to the world—safe travel, greater experience, time with your loved ones, you name it. Yet, the net amount of money that’s been made by the shareholders of airlines since Kitty Hawk, is now a negative figure—a substantial negative figure. Competition was so intense that, once it was unleashed by deregulation, it ravaged shareholder wealth in the airline business.? Yet, in other fields—like cereals, for example—almost all the big boys make out. If you’re some kind of a medium grade cereal maker, you might make 15% on your capital. And if you’re really good, you might make 40%. But why are cereals so profitable—despite the fact that it looks to me like they’re competing like crazy with promotions, coupons and everything else? I don’t fully understand it.? Obviously, there’s a brand identity factor in cereals that doesn’t exist in airlines. That must be the main factor that accounts for it.And maybe the cereal makers by and large have learned to be less crazy about fighting for market share—because if you get even one person who’s hell-bent on gaining market share…. For example, if I were Kellogg and I decided that I had to have 60% of the market, I think I could take most of the profit out of cereals. I’d ruin Kellogg in the process. But I think I could do it.”
“You must have the confidence to override people with more credentials than you whose cognition is impaired by incentive-caused bias or some similar psychological force that is obviously present. But there are also cases where you have to recognize that you have no wisdom to add – and that your best course is to trust some expert.”
75，許多市場(chǎng)最終會(huì)形成兩到三個(gè)大競(jìng)爭者 ---- 或者五到六個(gè)。其中有些市場(chǎng)里壓根兒沒有人能賺到什么錢。有些市場(chǎng)里每個(gè)競(jìng)爭者都做得不錯(cuò)。多年以來，我們一直在研究，為什么有些市場(chǎng)里競(jìng)爭比較理性，股東們獲得的回報(bào)都不錯(cuò)，而有些市場(chǎng)里的競(jìng)爭則讓股東血本無歸。我們舉航空公司的例子來說吧，咱們現(xiàn)在坐在這里，可以想到航空公司們?yōu)槭澜缱鞒龅母鞣N貢獻(xiàn) --- 安全的旅行、更好的體驗(yàn)、能夠隨時(shí)飛向你的愛人，等等。但是，這個(gè)行業(yè)自從萊特兄弟的時(shí)代以來，給股東們回報(bào)的利潤是負(fù)的，而且是一個(gè)巨大的負(fù)數(shù)。這個(gè)市場(chǎng)里的競(jìng)爭是如此激烈，以至于一旦放開監(jiān)管，航空公司們就開始（大降價(jià)）來損害股東們的權(quán)益。然而，在另外一些行業(yè)里，比如麥片行業(yè)，幾乎所有的競(jìng)爭者都混得挺舒服。如果你是一家中型的麥片生產(chǎn)商，你大概能有15%的資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率。如果你的本事特別好，甚至能達(dá)到40%。但是為什么麥片這么掙錢呢？在我看來他們整天搞各種瘋狂的營銷、推廣、優(yōu)惠券來激烈競(jìng)爭，竟然還這么掙錢。我不是很明白。顯然，品牌效應(yīng)的因素是麥片行業(yè)有而航空行業(yè)沒有的。這可能是個(gè)主要因素?；蛘啕溒a(chǎn)商們有共識(shí)，認(rèn)為誰都不可以那么瘋狂地競(jìng)爭 ---- 因?yàn)槿绻幸粋€(gè)二楞子視市場(chǎng)占有率如命根，比如說如果我是家樂氏的老板然后我決定要搶占60%的市場(chǎng)占有率，我想我可以把這個(gè)市場(chǎng)的大部分利潤都給弄沒了。這個(gè)過程中我可能會(huì)把家樂氏給毀掉。但是我想我還是可以做到（占據(jù)市場(chǎng)以及消滅行業(yè)利潤）。你應(yīng)該有信心去顛覆那些比你資深的人，條件是他們的認(rèn)知被動(dòng)機(jī)導(dǎo)致的偏見蒙蔽了、或者被類似的心理因素明顯影響了。但是在另外一些情況下，你應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到你也許沒有什么新意可想 --- 你最好的選擇就是相信這些領(lǐng)域中的專家。
(76)”In business we often find that the winning system goes almost ridiculously far in maximizing and or minimizing one or a few variables — like the discount warehouses of Costco.”
76，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)那些在生意中優(yōu)勝的“系統(tǒng)”往往有些變量被近乎荒謬地最大化或者最小化 ---- 比如Costco的打折倉儲(chǔ)店。
(77)”There are worse situations than drowning in cash and sitting, sitting, sitting. I remember when I wasn’t awash in cash — and I don’t want to go back.”
77，有些情況比坐擁大量現(xiàn)金無處可投更糟糕。我還記得當(dāng)年缺錢的情景 --- 我可不想回到那個(gè)時(shí)候。
(78)”If you always tell people why, they’ll understand it better, they’ll consider it more important, and they’ll be more likely to comply.”
78，如果你（在發(fā)出指令和訴求的時(shí)候）總是告訴他們你的原因，他們就會(huì)更好地理解你的意圖，并且覺得你的想法更重要，他們也就更愿意聽你的。
(79)”Spend less than you make; always be saving something. Put it into a tax-deferred account. Over time, it will begin to amount to something. This is such a no-brainer.”
79，量入而出、時(shí)刻攢錢、把錢放到可以延期交稅的賬戶里。時(shí)間長了，你就會(huì)攢出一筆財(cái)富了。 這完全不需要?jiǎng)邮裁茨X子。
(80)”I try to get rid of people who always confidently answer questions about which they don’t have any real knowledge.”
80，我盡量遠(yuǎn)離那些不懂裝懂的人。
(81)”I believe in the discipline of mastering the best that other people have ever figured out. I don’t believe in just sitting down and trying to dream it all up yourself. Nobody’s that smart…”
81，我覺得先好好掌握別人已經(jīng)整理好的知識(shí)才是靠譜的學(xué)習(xí)方法。我不認(rèn)可那種閉門造車自己鼓搗出結(jié)果的方法。沒人能那么聰明。
(82)”I know someone who lives next door to what you would actually call a fairly modest house that just sold for $17 million. There are some very extreme housing price bubbles going on .”
82，我有個(gè)熟人，他們家旁邊那個(gè)房子看起來很不起眼的，但是竟然賣了1700萬美元。房市價(jià)格有很極端的泡沫。
(83)”Experience tends to confirm a long-held notion that being prepared, on a few occasions in a lifetime, to act promptly in scale, in doing some simple and logical thing, will often dramatically improve the financial results of that lifetime. A few major opportunities, clearly recognizable as such, will usually come to one who continuously searches and waits, with a curious mind that loves diagnosis involving multiple variables. And then all that is required is a willingness to bet heavily when the odds are extremely favorable, using resources available as a result of prudence and patience in the past.”
83，經(jīng)驗(yàn)告訴我們，當(dāng)機(jī)會(huì)來臨的時(shí)候，如果你有足夠的準(zhǔn)備并且適時(shí)、果斷、有魄力地做一些簡單而合理的事情，就能奇跡般地讓你致富。偶爾出現(xiàn)的這種機(jī)會(huì)往往賜予那些時(shí)刻準(zhǔn)備著、一直搜尋著、并且愿意分析復(fù)雜事物的人。當(dāng)機(jī)會(huì)出現(xiàn)的時(shí)候，你所要做的全部事情就是使用你平時(shí)謹(jǐn)慎耐心攢下來的彈藥、大手下注在那些勝算極大的賭局上。
(84)”The present era has no comparable referent in the past history of capitalism. We have a higher percentage of the intelligentsia engaged in buying and selling pieces of paper and promoting trading activity than in any past era. A lot of what I see now reminds me of Sodom and Gomorrah. You get activity feeding on itself, envy and imitation. It has happened in the past that there came bad consequences.”
84，現(xiàn)在這個(gè)時(shí)代是以往的資本主義中沒見過的。與以往相比，我們有史上最多的知識(shí)分子投身在炒賣股票和投機(jī)倒把上。許多我所見到的事情讓我聯(lián)想起索多瑪和蛾摩拉（墮落罪惡之城）。自私、妒忌、還有各種山寨貨。以前也有過這些事情，它們導(dǎo)致了可怕的后果。
(85)”O(jiān)ur investment style has been given a name – focus investing – which implies ten holdings, not one hundred or four hundred. The idea that it is hard to find good investments, so concentrate in a few, seems to me to be an obvious idea. But 98% of the investment world does not think this way. It’s been good for us.”
85，我們的投資風(fēng)格被稱作焦點(diǎn)投資，意在持有十只股票、而不是一百個(gè)或者四百個(gè)。好投資不好找，所以應(yīng)該集中在那些少數(shù)幾個(gè)好的上，這對(duì)于我是很顯而易見的事情。但是投資界98%的人都不這么想。這對(duì)我們倒是挺好的。
(86)”You want to be very careful with intense ideology. It presents a big danger for the only mind you’re ever going to get.”
86，你要當(dāng)心過于強(qiáng)烈的意識(shí)形態(tài)觀念。如果你腦子里只有一個(gè)念頭的話那是非常危險(xiǎn)的。
(87)”Like Warren, I had a considerable passion to get rich. “Not because I wanted Ferraris– I wanted the independence. I desperately wanted it.”
87，和巴菲特一樣，我有很強(qiáng)的致富欲望。不是因?yàn)槲蚁矚g法拉利什么的，而是我喜歡獨(dú)立。我極度渴望獨(dú)立。
(88)”Anyone with an engineering frame of mind will look at [accounting standards] and want to throw up.”
88，每一個(gè)有工程師思維的人看到會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則都會(huì)想吐。
(89)”You can progress only when you learn the method of learning.”
89，你只有學(xué)會(huì)了如何學(xué)習(xí)才能進(jìn)步。
(90)”It’s a good habit to trumpet your failures and be quiet about your successes.”
90，多談?wù)勀愕氖v程、少吹噓你的成功經(jīng)歷，這樣對(duì)你好。
(91)”In effect about half our spare cash was stashed in currencies other than the dollar. I consider that a non-event. As it happens it’s been a very profitable non-event.”
91，實(shí)際效果上說，我們有一半的閑置現(xiàn)金是以美元以外的貨幣形式存儲(chǔ)的。我覺得這個(gè)不是什么大事兒。沒想到這件事情成了件很賺錢的小事兒。
(92)”As for what we like least, we don’t want kleptocracies. We need a rule of law. If people are stealing from the companies, we don’t need that.”
92，我們最不喜歡的東西就是盜賊統(tǒng)治。我們需要法治。如果人們都從公司里盜取東西，我們不要這種公司。
(93)”I agree with Peter Drucker that the culture and legal systems of the United States are especially favorable to shareholder interests, compared to other interests and compared to most other countries. Indeed, there are many other countries where any good going to public shareholders has a very low priority and almost every other constituency stands higher in line.”
我同意德魯克的觀點(diǎn)，他認(rèn)為美國相對(duì)其他國家而言是對(duì)公司股東最優(yōu)惠的國家。事實(shí)上，很多國家的上市公司股東權(quán)益是很沒優(yōu)先級(jí)的，需要讓位于各種其他人群的利益。
(94)”Berkshire in its history has made money betting on sure things.”
94，Berkshire的歷史就是在確定的事情上打賭的過程。
(95)”I don’t think there’s any business that we’ve bought that would have sold itself to a hedge fund. There’s a class of businesses that doesn’t want to deal with private-equity and hedge funds…thank God”
95，我覺得我們買的公司都不會(huì)愿意（把股份）賣給對(duì)沖基金。有那么一類公司是不愿意應(yīng)付私募股權(quán)和對(duì)沖基金的，謝天謝地有這種公司。
(96)”We’re guessing at our future opportunity cost. Warren is guessing that he’ll have the opportunity to put capital out at high rates of return, so he’s not willing to put it out at less than 10% now. But if we knew interest rates would stay at 1%, we’d change. Our hurdles reflect our estimate of future opportunity costs.”
96，我們?cè)诓聹y(cè)未來的機(jī)會(huì)成本。巴菲特認(rèn)為將來有可能遇到很高回報(bào)的機(jī)會(huì)，所以他現(xiàn)在不會(huì)為10%回報(bào)的機(jī)會(huì)出手。但是如果我們知道利率一直保持在1%，我們會(huì)改變策略的。我們的倉位取決于我們對(duì)未來機(jī)會(huì)成本的預(yù)測(cè)。
(97)”O(jiān)ur ideas are so simple that people keep asking us for mysteries when all we have are the most elementary ideas.”
97，我們的想法都是很簡單的，以至于人們總是希望我們能說點(diǎn)兒神秘的東西出來，但是我們的方法就是這么簡單。
(98)”The idea of a margin of safety, a Graham precept, will never be obsolete. The idea of making the market your servant will never be obsolete. The idea of being objective and dispassionate will never be obsolete. So Graham had a lot of wonderful ideas.”
98，格雷厄姆的安全邊際理念、不讓市場(chǎng)主宰自己的理念、保持平常心的理念永遠(yuǎn)都不會(huì)過時(shí)。所以格雷厄姆有很多很好的理念。
(99)”Ben Graham could run his Geiger counter over this detritus from the collapse of the 1930s and find things selling below their working capital per share and so on….? But he was, by and large, operating when the world was in shell shock from the 1930s—which was the worst contraction in the English-speaking world in about 600 years. Wheat in Liverpool, I believe, got down to something like a 600-year low, adjusted for inflation. the classic Ben Graham concept is that gradually the world wised up and those real obvious bargains disappeared. You could run your Geiger counter over the rubble and it wouldn’t click. … Ben Graham followers responded by changing the calibration on their Geiger counters. In effect, they started defining a bargain in a different way. And they kept changing the definition so that they could keep doing what they’d always done. And it still worked pretty well.”
99，格雷厄姆的方法就像是拿著探測(cè)器在30年代的廢墟里尋找寶貝 --- 股價(jià)比每股現(xiàn)金還低的便宜股票。但總的來說，他工作的時(shí)代是全世界還陷在二戰(zhàn)戰(zhàn)后恐懼癥的時(shí)代，那是英語世界600年來通縮最嚴(yán)重的時(shí)代。利物浦的小麥價(jià)格跌到了600百年的最低值。經(jīng)典的格雷厄姆理念認(rèn)為世界會(huì)漸漸蘇醒過來，這些便宜會(huì)消失的。你拿著那時(shí)候的探測(cè)器在現(xiàn)在的廢墟里恐怕是找不到寶貝的。所以格雷厄姆的追隨者們就調(diào)整了探測(cè)器，他們開始用現(xiàn)代的方法來定義寶貝。他們一直在改進(jìn)探測(cè)器，來做自己擅長的事情 --- 尋寶。直到現(xiàn)在，他們都還做得不錯(cuò)。
(100)”Warren and I don’t feel like we have any great advantage in the high-tech sector. In fact, we feel like we’re at a big disadvantage in trying to understand the nature of technical developments in software, computer chips or what have you. So we tend to avoid that stuff, based on our personal inadequacies. Again, that is a very, very powerful idea. Every person is going to have a circle of competence. And it’s going to be very hard to advance that circle. If I had to make my living as a musician…. I can’t even think of a level low enough to describe where I would be sorted out to if music were the measuring standard of the civilization.? So you have to figure out what your own aptitudes are. If you play games where other people have the aptitudes and you don’t, you’re going to lose. And that’s as close to certain as any prediction that you can make. You have to figure out where you’ve got an edge. And you’ve got to play within your own circle of competence.? If you want to be the best tennis player in the world, you may start out trying and soon find out that it’s hopeless—that other people blow right by you. However, if you want to become the best plumbing contractor in Bemidji, that is probably doable by two-thirds of you. It takes a will. It takes the intelligence. But after a while, you’d gradually know all about the plumbing business in Bemidji and master the art. That is an attainable objective, given enough discipline. And people who could never win a chess tournament or stand in center court in a respectable tennis tournament can rise quite high in life by slowly developing a circle of competence—which results partly from what they were born with and partly from what they slowly develop through work.”
100，巴菲特和我在高科技領(lǐng)域都沒有什么優(yōu)勢(shì)。我們覺得讓我們?nèi)チ私廛浖?、芯片之類的東西我們討不著好。所以，基于這些不足，我們盡量避免這些東西。這又是一個(gè)很重要的思維。每個(gè)人都有自己的能力圈，而且這個(gè)能力圈很難增長。如果我要依靠音樂謀生的話 --- 我就完蛋了。所以你應(yīng)該想想自己的天資在什么地方。如果你在從事別人有天賦而你沒有的工作，你肯定是要輸?shù)?。沒有意外。你要知道你的強(qiáng)項(xiàng)在什么地方，要在你的能力圈里面玩兒。如果你想做天下第一網(wǎng)球手，你可能很快發(fā)現(xiàn)自己沒戲，有人會(huì)迅速贏你好幾條街。但是如果你想做城關(guān)鎮(zhèn)的水管承包商，可能三分之二的人都能做到。這需要一個(gè)意向和一些智力投入。但是一段時(shí)間之后你就會(huì)慢慢了解城關(guān)鎮(zhèn)的水管行業(yè)并且漸漸掌握這門藝術(shù)了。這是一個(gè)可以達(dá)到的目標(biāo)，只要有足夠的付出。就是運(yùn)用一些與生俱來或者后天慢慢養(yǎng)成的能力圈，那些即使從來沒有贏過象棋比賽和網(wǎng)球比賽的人們也可以在生活中走向不小的成功。
(101)”Beta and modern portfolio theory and the like – none of it makes any sense to me.”
101，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)系數(shù)貝塔和現(xiàn)代投資組合理論都一樣 --- 對(duì)于我來說完全是瞎搞。
(102)”Today, it seems to be regarded as the duty of CEOs to make the stock go up. This leads to all sorts of foolish behavior. We want to tell it like it is.”
102，今天，保持股價(jià)似乎成了總裁們的任務(wù)之一，這引發(fā)了很多愚蠢的行為。我們這是實(shí)事求是。
(103)”O(jiān)ur standard prescription for the know-nothing investor with a long-term time horizon is a no-load index fund. I think that works better than relying on your stock broker. The people who are telling you to do something else are all being paid by commissions or fees. The result is that while index fund investing is becoming more and more popular, by and large it’s not the individual investors that are doing it. It’s the institutions.”
103，對(duì)門外漢投資者們，我們的一貫標(biāo)準(zhǔn)建議都是購買免傭金的指數(shù)基金。我認(rèn)為這要比你的股票經(jīng)紀(jì)的建議更好。那些建議你購買其他金融產(chǎn)品的人往往都是借以收取傭金和費(fèi)用的。其結(jié)果就是越來越多的資金投放在指數(shù)基金上，而這里大部分都是機(jī)構(gòu)，而不是個(gè)人。（意即他們拿了你的錢去買指數(shù)基金，還收你手續(xù)費(fèi)和傭金。）
(104)”closet indexing….you’re paying a manager a fortune and he has 85% of his assets invested parallel to the indexes. If you have such a system, you’re being played for a sucker.”
104，"黑箱追指數(shù)"投資法（一種大部分錢投資于指數(shù)成份股，小部分由基金經(jīng)理選股的投資組合，一般不公開策略，意在接近指數(shù)的表現(xiàn)）……你給經(jīng)理支付一大筆錢，而他把85%的錢照著指數(shù)成分投資。如果你是這么干的，你就被人當(dāng)傻子玩兒了。
(105)”Black-Scholes is a know-nothing system. If you know nothing about value — only price — then Black-Scholes is a pretty good guess at what a 90-day option might be worth. But the minute you get into longer periods of time, it’s crazy to get into Black-Scholes.”
105，布萊克-舒爾斯模型（一種衍生品定價(jià)模型）是一種白癡模型。如果你對(duì)于標(biāo)的物的價(jià)值一無所知而只知道價(jià)格，那么這個(gè)模型對(duì)于90天的期權(quán)定價(jià)還是有價(jià)值的。但當(dāng)你要放眼于更長的時(shí)間的時(shí)候，使用這個(gè)模型就是瘋了。
(106)”Black-Scholes works for short-term options, but if it’s a long-term option and you think you know something [about the underlying asset], it’s insane to use Black-Scholes.”
106，同105.
(107)”It’s hard to predict what will happen with two brands in a market.? Sometimes they will behave in a gentlemanly way, and sometimes they’ll pound each other.? I know of no way to predict whether they’ll compete moderately or to the death.? If you could figure it out, you could make a lot of money.”
107，很難預(yù)測(cè)市場(chǎng)上兩個(gè)品牌間的競(jìng)爭狀況。有時(shí)候他們會(huì)很君子地競(jìng)爭，有時(shí)候他們又會(huì)互相猛砍。我無法預(yù)測(cè)他們是會(huì)溫和共存還是血戰(zhàn)到底。如果你能預(yù)測(cè)得到，你就能賺很多錢。
(108)”We’ve really made the money out of high quality businesses. In some cases, we bought the whole business. And in some cases, we just bought a big block of stock. But when you analyze what happened, the big money’s been made in the high quality businesses. And most of the other people who’ve made a lot of money have done so in high quality businesses.”
108，我們掙的錢都是從那些優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)中來的。有些是我們?nèi)Y收購的、有些是我們部分擁有的。但是當(dāng)你分析我們的情況時(shí)，大錢總是從優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)里來。其他人也是這樣，從優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)身上賺到錢。
(109)”A lot of share-buying, not bargain-seeking, is designed to prop stock prices up. Thirty to 40 years ago, it was very profitable to look at companies that were aggressively buying their own shares. They were motivated simply to buy below what it was worth.”
109，很多股份回購的行為只是為了刺激股價(jià)而不是趁低吸收股權(quán)。三四十年前，如果你去尋找那些積極回購股票的公司，可以賺不少錢，因?yàn)樗麄兡菚r(shí)候都是因?yàn)楣蓛r(jià)低于價(jià)值才回購的，很純粹很簡單。
(110)”There are two kinds of businesses: The first earns 12%, and you can take it out at the end of the year. The second earns 12%, but all the excess cash must be reinvested — there’s never any cash. It reminds me of the guy who looks at all of his equipment and says, “There’s all of my profit.” We hate that kind of business. “
110，有兩種生意：第一種每年掙12%，年底可以把錢拿回來；第二種每年掙12%，但是利潤必須重新投入運(yùn)營---永遠(yuǎn)也看不到現(xiàn)金。這讓我想到了一個(gè)家伙，他看著手里的一大堆（不能變現(xiàn)的）工具裝備，慨然嘆曰：“這就是我的全部利潤了?！?我們可不喜歡這種生意。
(111)”There are actually businesses, that you will find a few times in a lifetime, where any manager could raise the return enormously just by raising prices—and yet they haven’t done it. So they have huge untapped pricing power that they’re not using. That is the ultimate no-brainer. … Disney found that it could raise those prices a lot and the attendance stayed right up.? So a lot of the great record of Eisner and Wells … came from just raising prices at Disneyland and Disneyworld and through video cassette sales of classic animated movies… At Berkshire Hathaway, Warren and I raised the prices of See’s Candy a little faster than others might have. And, of course, we invested in Coca-Cola—which had some untapped pricing power. And it also had brilliant management. So a Goizueta and Keough could do much more than raise prices. It was perfect.”
111，有些生意你在人生中會(huì)見識(shí)幾次，這些生意里，隨便找個(gè)人當(dāng)經(jīng)理都能大幅提高利潤，只需要提高商品價(jià)格 --- 但是他們又沒有這么做。所以他們有很多未開發(fā)的定價(jià)權(quán)。這些生意是最不需要?jiǎng)幽X子的。迪士尼發(fā)現(xiàn)他們不管怎么提價(jià)，入場(chǎng)率都是那么高。所以艾斯納和威爾斯（迪士尼CEO）的“杰出表現(xiàn)”很大部分來源于給迪士尼樂園門票提價(jià)或者給迪士尼的動(dòng)畫提價(jià)。在我們這兒，巴菲特和我給See's糖果提價(jià)的速度比別人都更快一些。另外，當(dāng)然了，我們也投資了可口可樂，可口可樂也是有很多未開發(fā)的定價(jià)權(quán)的。而且可口可樂還有一個(gè)很棒的管理層，所以他們的CEO可以做許多提價(jià)以外的事情。這很完美。
(112)”At Berkshire Hathaway we do not like to compete against Chinese manufacturers.”
112，我們Berkshire不喜歡和中國生產(chǎn)企業(yè)競(jìng)爭。
(113)”Berkshire is in the business of making easy predictions ?If a deal looks too hard, the partners simply shelve it.”
113，Berkshire的工作是做簡單的預(yù)測(cè)，如果一個(gè)交易太難搞懂，我們會(huì)把它擱置一邊。
(114)”We’re the tortoise that has outrun the hare because it chose the easy predictions.”
114，我們是跑贏兔子的烏龜，因?yàn)槲覀兲裟切┖唵蔚氖虑閬眍A(yù)測(cè)。
(115)”"Warren and I avoid doing anything that someone else at Berkshire can do better. You don’t really have a competency if you don’t know the edge of it.”
115，巴菲特和我盡量不做那些公司內(nèi)有人比我們做得好的事情。如果你不知道你的能力圈的邊緣在哪兒，你等于沒有能力圈。
(116)”Understanding both the power of compound return and the difficulty of getting it is the heart and soul of understanding a lot of things.”?
116，理解復(fù)利的強(qiáng)大和難于達(dá)成，是理解很多事情的精髓。
(117)”Generally speaking, it can’t be good to be running a big current account deficit and a big fiscal deficit and have them both growing. You would be thinking the end there would be a comeuppance.” “[But] it isn’t as though all the other options look wonderful compared to the US. It gives me some feeling that what I regard as fiscal misbehavior on our part could go on some time without paying the price.”
117，總的來說，（美國）同時(shí)持續(xù)增長的出超和財(cái)政赤字肯定不是什么好事兒，你會(huì)想到最后應(yīng)該會(huì)有個(gè)大報(bào)應(yīng)的。但是比起（投資在）美國，其他的選擇也不見得有多好。所以我的感覺是，雖然現(xiàn)在我們的財(cái)政不太靠譜，但一段時(shí)間內(nèi)繼續(xù)如此也暫時(shí)不會(huì)付出代價(jià)。
(118)”We started from such a strong position. It’s not as if the alternatives are all so great. I can understand why people would rather invest in the? U.S. Do you want to be in Europe, where 12-13% of people are unemployed and most 28-year-olds are living at home and being paid by state to do it? Or be in Brazil or Venezuela with the political instability that you fear? It’s not totally irrational that? people still like the U.S., despite its faults. Whatever misbehavior there is could go on quite a long time without a price being paid.”
118，我們（美國）的底子很好。除了美國以外其他的選擇也不怎么樣。我可以理解為什么人們還是寧愿投資在美國。難道你想投到歐洲嗎？那兒的失業(yè)率高達(dá)12%、13%，大部分28歲的人都住在家里靠政府養(yǎng)著。難道你想投到巴西和委內(nèi)瑞拉？那兒的政局不穩(wěn)你整天得擔(dān)驚受怕。美國有這么多的錯(cuò)誤但是人們依然喜愛美國是有道理的?，F(xiàn)在不靠譜的（財(cái)政策略）還可以繼續(xù)一段時(shí)間而不用付出代價(jià)。
(119)”Almost all good businesses engage in ‘pain today, gain tomorrow’ activities.”
119，幾乎所有的好生意都是“今日付出，明日回報(bào)”類的。
(120)”No CEO examining books today understands what the hell is going on.”
120，今天的總裁沒有能通過看報(bào)表搞明白發(fā)生什么事兒的。（意在諷刺現(xiàn)代財(cái)報(bào)的不科學(xué)）
(121)”Generally speaking, if you’re counting on outside directors to act [forcefully to protect your interests as a shareholder, then you’re crazy].? As a general rule in? America, boards act only if there’s been a severe disgrace. My friend Joe was asked to be on the board of Northwestern Bell and he jokes that ‘it was the last thing they ever asked me.’?I think you get better directors when you get directors who don’t need the money. ?When it’s half your income and all your retirement, you’re not likely to be very independent.? But when you have money and an existing reputation that you don’t want to lose, then you’ll act more independently.”
(122)”If mutual fund directors are independent, then I’m the lead character in the Bolshoi Ballet.”
122，如果共有基金的董事能夠做到獨(dú)立，那我就是莫斯科芭蕾舞團(tuán)的主跳。
(123)”O(jiān)f course I’m troubled by huge consumer debt levels – we’ve pushed consumer credit very hard in the US.? Eventually, if it keeps growing, it will stop growing. As Herb Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”? When it stops, it may be unpleasant.? Other than Herb Stein’s quote, I have no comment.”
123，我當(dāng)然對(duì)現(xiàn)在的巨大消費(fèi)債務(wù)感到擔(dān)憂。我們美國一直過于致力于推進(jìn)信用消費(fèi)了。如果他持續(xù)增長，總有一天會(huì)停止增長的。就像赫伯·斯坦恩說的“任何不能永遠(yuǎn)前進(jìn)的東西都會(huì)有停止的一刻?！?當(dāng)信用消費(fèi)停止增長的時(shí)候，恐怕就不好過了。我完全同意斯坦恩的說法，別無評(píng)價(jià)。
(124)”?I think it would be a great improvement if there were no D&O insurance . The counter-argument is that no-one with any money would serve on a board. But I think net net you’d be better off.”
124，如果消滅“董事高管責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)”，我認(rèn)為是一大進(jìn)步。但反方的觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為那樣的話有錢人就都不愿意擔(dān)任董事了。但總的來說我認(rèn)為消滅它還是好的。
(125)”We don’t care about quarterly earnings (though obviously we care about how the business is doing over time) and are unwilling to manipulate in any way to make some quarter look better.”
125，我們不在意單季度盈利（雖然我們關(guān)注一個(gè)企業(yè)長期表現(xiàn)如何），也很不愿意用任何方法修改報(bào)表以便某一季度的結(jié)果看上去更好。
(126)”What we don’t like in modern capitalism is the expectations game. It’s not the kissing cousin of evil; it’s the blood brother.”
126，對(duì)于現(xiàn)代資本主義，我們不喜歡的部分是拼預(yù)測(cè)。這玩意兒特別邪惡。
(127)”There are a lot of things we pass on. We have three baskets: in, out, and too tough…We have to have a special insight, or we’ll put it in the ‘too tough’ basket. All of you have to look for a special area of competency and focus on that.”
127，我們略過很多東西的。我們有三個(gè)籃子：留著的、要扔的、太難懂的。如果我們沒有特別看懂它的前景，我們就把它扔進(jìn)太難懂的那個(gè)籃子。你們要做的就是尋找一個(gè)你們特別有競(jìng)爭力的領(lǐng)域并且專注于此。
(128)”We have a history when things are really horrible of wading in when no one else will.”
128，我們?cè)?jīng)在沒有任何人敢涉足的時(shí)候進(jìn)場(chǎng)（買進(jìn)）過。
(129)”We have monetized houses in this country in a way that’s never occurred before. Ask Joe how he bought a new Cadillac [and he’ll say] from borrowing on his house. We are awash in capital. [Being] awash is leading to very terrible behavior by credit cards and subprime lenders -a very dirty business, luring people into a disadvantageous position. It’s a new way of getting serfs, and it’s a dirty business. We have financial institutions, including those with big names, extending high-cost credit to the least able people. I find a lot of it revolting. Just because it’s a free market doesn’t mean it’s honorable.”
129，我們當(dāng)今用房子套錢的方法以前從未出現(xiàn)過。你問張三他是怎么買的寶馬，他會(huì)告訴你是靠抵押房子貸的款。我們現(xiàn)在資本過剩。資本過剩會(huì)導(dǎo)致人們瘋狂刷信用卡和放債人發(fā)放次貸 ---- 發(fā)放次貸是一個(gè)骯臟的生意。它誘惑人們前往絕地。這是一種獲取奴隸的新方法，這是很臟的生意。我們有些金融機(jī)構(gòu) --- 包括那些大行 ---- 都在向那些弱勢(shì)群體發(fā)放次貸。我覺得這種行為令人厭惡。自由市場(chǎng)是自由的并不意味著它就是光榮的。
(130)”We don’t believe that markets are totally efficient and we don’t believe that widespread diversification will yield a good result.? We believe almost all good investments will involve relatively low diversification. Maybe 2% of people will come into our corner of the tent and the rest of the 98% will believe what they’ve been told.”
130，我們不認(rèn)為市場(chǎng)是完全有效的，也不相信分散投資會(huì)帶來更好的結(jié)果。我們認(rèn)為最好的投資都是比較集中的。大概2%的人會(huì)跟我們站在同一個(gè)立場(chǎng)，其他的都還是相信他們所聽到的那些謬論。
(131)”Efficient market theory [is]? a wonderful economic doctrine that had a long vogue in spite of the experience of Berkshire Hathaway. In fact one of the economists who won — he shared a Nobel Prize — and as he looked at Berkshire Hathaway year after year, which people would throw in his face as saying maybe the market isn’t quite as efficient as you think, he said, “Well, it’s a two-sigma event.” And then he said we were a three-sigma event. And then he said we were a four-sigma event. And he finally got up to six sigmas — better to add a sigma than change a theory, just because the evidence comes in differently.And, of course, when this share of a Nobel Prize went into money management himself, he sank like a stone.”
131，市場(chǎng)有效論是一個(gè)很好的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教條，流行了很長時(shí)間，但是跟我們Berkshire Hathaway的經(jīng)驗(yàn)相悖。事實(shí)上依靠此理論獲得諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)的其中一位經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家也觀察了我們公司好多年，人們當(dāng)他面質(zhì)問他，說市場(chǎng)恐怕不那么有效吧，不然怎么解釋Berkshire的戰(zhàn)績，他就說我們是一個(gè)小概率的例子，有兩個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差。然后他又說我們這個(gè)例子有三個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差。然后又說我們四個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差。最后終于多到了六個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差。他寧愿給我們多弄幾個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差也不愿意修改他的理論。當(dāng)然了，最后當(dāng)他拿獲得的諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)金自己去投資的時(shí)候，錢就泥牛入海了。
(132)”I know just enough about? thermodynamics to understand that if it takes too much fossil-fuel energy to create ethanol, that’s a very stupid way to solve an energy problem.”
132，我雖然懂的熱力學(xué)知識(shí)不多，但還是足以判斷這個(gè)事兒：如果你要花費(fèi)很多石油資源去生產(chǎn)乙醇，那么用乙醇替代石油就是一件很傻的節(jié)能方案。
(133)”It is entirely possible that you could use our mental models to find good IPOs to buy. There are countless IPOs every year, and I’m sure that there are a few cinches that you could jump on. But the average person is going to get creamed. So if you’re talented, good luck. IPOs are too small for us, or too high tech, so we won’t understand them. So, if Warren’s looking at them, I don’t know about it.”
我對(duì)剛剛IPO的公司也不感興趣，主要是沒足夠時(shí)間和資料去搞懂。
133，你用我們的思路去找靠譜的IPO來買是完全可能的。每年都有數(shù)不清的IPO，我相信肯定有一些是值得整一下的。但是大部分人都是被忽悠的。如果你很有才能，祝你好運(yùn)。對(duì)我們來說，IPO要么太小、要么太高科技所以我們搞不懂。如果巴菲特有在關(guān)注它們，我自己是不知道的。
(134)”Well envy/jealousy made, what, two out of the ten commandments? Those of you who have raised siblings you know about envy, or tried to run a law firm or investment bank or even a faculty? I’ve heard Warren say a half a dozen times, “It’s not greed that drives the world, but envy.”
134，你看，妒忌和嫉妒，一個(gè)事兒占了十誡里的兩個(gè)位置。你們養(yǎng)過小孩兒們的、開律所的、管投行的、甚至當(dāng)系主任的，都知道妒忌是怎么回事兒。我聽巴菲特說過好多次：“帶領(lǐng)世界前進(jìn)的不是貪婪、而是妒忌的力量?！?br>(135)”Suppose, any one of you knew of a wonderful thing right now that you were overwhelmingly confident- and correctly so- would produce about 12% per annum compounded as far as you could see. Now, if you actually had that available, and by going into it you were forfeiting all opportunities to make money faster- there’re a lot of you who wouldn’t like that. But a lot of you would think, “What the hell do I care if somebody else makes money faster?” There’s always going to be somebody who is making money faster, running the mile faster or what have you. So in a human sense, once you get something that works fine in your life, the idea of caring terribly that somebody else is making money faster strikes me as insane.” 這里我看到兩點(diǎn)：1.平常心地呆在自己能力圈內(nèi); 2. 12%是個(gè)可接受的年復(fù)合回報(bào)率。
135，假設(shè)一個(gè)場(chǎng)景，你知道有一個(gè)鐵板釘釘沒跑兒的機(jī)會(huì)可以帶來12%的復(fù)合年回報(bào)。現(xiàn)在，假如這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)放在你面前，但是要求你從此不再接受別的賺快錢的機(jī)會(huì)，你們中大部分人是不愿意干的。但你們中很多人也會(huì)說：“別人賺錢快為什么我要在意呢？” 這世界總有些人會(huì)賺錢比你快、跑得比你快、或者別的什么比你快。但是，從理智的角度來思考，一旦你自己找到了一件運(yùn)行良好的機(jī)制能致富，還非要在意別人賺錢比你快，這在我來看就是瘋了。
