以前看過一篇轉載傳閱很多的文章《巴菲特和芒格談估值》，今天終于找到的了原版英文的出處。
來自于1997年伯克希爾股東大會下午場的第2個問題。
原文確實非常非常精彩，值得反反復復閱讀。
對于這種非常經(jīng)典的文章，我是一定要去閱讀英文原版的。
另外， 雪球用戶“樂趣”在2012年的時候就結合茅臺寫過讀后感，同樣非常經(jīng)典。
下面第一部分是原版英文以及對應的中文翻譯，特別感謝雪球@一朵喵 的精彩翻譯。
第二部分是@樂趣 的原版文章，放在一起，方便學習查閱。
$貴州茅臺(SH600519)$ $格力電器(SZ000651)$
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2、如何購買一門生意（★★★）
股東：我是弗雷德·庫克，來自科羅拉多州博爾德。
這是一個關于內在價值的問題。這個個問題希望你倆都能回答，過去你們曾寫過關于這個問題的答案，這次也許你們會想出不同的答案。
你寫了很多關于內在價值的東西，并且表明你試圖在年度報告中給股東提供足夠的工具，這樣他們就能做出自己的決定。
我希望你們能在此基礎上再擴展一下。首先，你認為在伯克希爾年報或其他你審閱過的年報中，決定內在價值的重要工具是什么?
其次，您在應用這些工具時使用哪些規(guī)則、原則或標準?
最后，這個過程，也就是這些工具的使用、標準的應用，是如何與你之前描述的篩選標準聯(lián)系起來的呢?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. I’m Fred Cooker (PH) from Boulder, Colorado.
And this is a question about intrinsic value. And it’s a question for both of you because you have written that, perhaps, you would come up with different answers.
You write and speak a great deal about intrinsic value, and you indicate that you try to give shareholders the tools in the annual report so they can come to their own determination.
What I’d like you to do is expand upon that a little bit.
First of all, what do you believe to be the important tools, either in the Berkshire annual report or other annual reports that you review, in determining intrinsic value?
Secondly, what rules or principles or standards do you use in applying those tools?
And lastly, how does that process, that is the use of the tools, the application of the standards, relate to what you have previously described as the filters you use in determining your valuation of a company?
巴菲特：如果我們能夠洞悉任何企業(yè)的未來——比方說——100年或者企業(yè)滅亡時在企業(yè)和股東之間的現(xiàn)金流入以及現(xiàn)金流出，然后以適當?shù)睦省@個我等會再談，并將其折現(xiàn)到現(xiàn)在，我們就會得到內在價值的數(shù)值。
WARREN BUFFETT: If we could see, you know, looking at any business, what its future cash inflows or outflows from the business to the owners — or from the owners — would be over the next, we’ll call it, a hundred years, or until the business is extinct, and then could discount that back at the appropriate interest rate, which I’ll get to in a second, that would give us a number for intrinsic value.
這和計算一張貼著許多息票、100年后到期的債券的價值很相似。如果你知道息票有多少，就能通過以適當?shù)娘L險利率折現(xiàn)來計算它的內在價值。
或者你可以將息票率為5%的債券與息票率為7%的債券進行比較。每張債券的價值都不一樣，因為它們的息票率不同。
In other words, it would be like looking at a bond that had a whole bunch of coupons on it that was due in a hundred years. And if you could see what those coupons are, you can figure the value of that bond compared to government bonds, if you want to stick an appropriate risk rate in.
Or you can compare one government bond with 5 percent coupons to another government bond with 7 percent coupons. Each one of those bonds has a different value because they have different coupons printed on them.
其實企業(yè)也有息票，這些息票未來會發(fā)生變化，只不過沒有印在股票上。因此，企業(yè)未來的息票要由投資者自己來估計。
就像我們以前所說的那樣，像高科技企業(yè)這樣的公司，我們一點都不知道其未來的息票是多少。
Businesses have coupons that are going to develop in the future, too. The only problem is they aren’t printed on the instrument. And it’s up to the investor to try to estimate what those coupons are going to be over time.
As we have said, in high-tech businesses or something like that, we don’t have the faintest idea what the coupons are going to be.
但是當我們找到一家我們認為自己相當懂的企業(yè)時，我們就會努力考察它的未來，并計算它未來的息票是多少。事實上，我們可以說是試圖現(xiàn)在就把這些未來的息票打印出來，這就是我們判斷一家企業(yè)10年或20年后的價值所采取的方法。
When we get into businesses where we think we can understand them reasonably well, we are trying to print the coupons out. We are trying to figure out what businesses are going to be worth in ten or 20 years.
當我們于1972年買下喜詩糖果的時候，我們當時不得不在以下方面得出結論：我們能否弄明白經(jīng)營的競爭環(huán)境、喜詩糖果的優(yōu)勢以及劣勢、今后10年、20年或30年這家企業(yè)的情況會如何。
如果你試著評估內在價值，就會發(fā)現(xiàn)全都與現(xiàn)金流有關。
When we bought See’s Candy in 1972, we had to come to the judgment as to whether we could figure out the competitive forces that would operate, the strengths and weaknesses of the company, and how that would look over a ten or 20 or 30-year period.
And if you attempt to assess intrinsic value, it all relates to cash flows.
當前在任何一個投資對象中投入現(xiàn)金的唯一原因，是你期待將來可以取出現(xiàn)金，不是通過將投資賣給他人(因為這是一種十足的狗咬狗[who beats who]游戲)，而是通過你投資的資產的產出。
購買一座農場是這樣，買一套公寓也是這樣，購買一家企業(yè)同樣如此。
The only reason for putting cash into any kind of an investment now is because you expect to take cash out. Not by selling it to somebody else, because that’s just a game of who beats who, but, in a sense, by what the asset, itself, produces.
That’s true if you’re buying a farm. It’s true if you’re buying an apartment house. It’s true if you’re buying a business.
你提到了我們的篩選標準。我們不知道有些企業(yè)10年或20年后價值幾何，甚至連一個有把握的猜測也提供不了。
顯然，我們不認為我們對企業(yè)價值的估算能夠精確到小數(shù)點后第二位或者第三位。不過，對于某些企業(yè)，我們還是十拿九穩(wěn)的。
And the filters you describe. There are a number of filters which say to us we don’t know what that business is going to be worth in ten or 20 years. And we can’t even make an educated guess.
Obviously, we don’t think we know to three decimal places, or two decimal places, or anything like that, precisely what’s going to be produced. But we have a high degree of confidence that we’re in the ballpark with certain kinds of businesses.
我們設計篩選標準的目的就是為了確保我們投對企業(yè)。我們基本上使用無風險的、期限較長的政府債券的利率作為折現(xiàn)率。
投資就是今天投出去錢，為了在將來收獲更多——不是通過將投資的資產賣給其他人，而是通過資產自身的產出。
The filters are designed to make sure we’re in those kinds of businesses. We, basically, use long-term, risk-free government bond-type interest rates to think back in terms of what we should discount at.
And, you know, that’s what the game of investment is all about. Investment is putting out money to get more money back later on from the asset. And not by selling it to somebody else, but by what the asset, itself, will produce.
如果你是投資者，就會關注你所投資的資產——對我們而言是企業(yè)——未來的表現(xiàn)。
如果你是投機者，主要關注的是資產的價格未來將會怎樣，而不管資產自身的未來表現(xiàn)。而投機不是我們的游戲。
If you’re an investor, you’re looking at what the asset — you’re looking at what the asset is going to do — in our case, businesses.
If you’re a speculator, you’re primarily focusing on what the price of the object is going to do independent of the business. And that’s not our game.
我們知道，如果我們對企業(yè)的判斷是正確的，將會賺很多錢。如果判斷是錯誤的，就不會有任何希望——我們不指望賺錢。
說到評估伯克希爾的價值，我們試著告訴你們盡可能多的關于我們企業(yè)的信息，所有關鍵的因素。
我們在年報中介紹我們企業(yè)所使用的方法和指標，與查理和我在考察其他企業(yè)時所用的一樣。
So we figure if we’re right about the business, we’re going to make a lot of money. And if we’re wrong about the business, we don’t have any hopes — we don’t expect to make money.
And in looking at Berkshire, we try to tell you as much as possible as we can about our business, of the key factors. Those are the things that Charlie and I —
With the things we put in our report about those businesses are the things that we look at ourselves.
所以，如果查理和伯克希爾一點關系都沒有，但他在看了我們的財報之后，得到的內在價值肯定和他在伯克希爾待了這么多年得出的結果差不多一樣，至少我是這么認為的。
在評估伯克希爾內在價值方面，該有的信息都有了，我們給你們的信息也是——假如我們的位置調換的話——我們想從你們那里得到的信息。
So if Charlie had nothing to do with Berkshire but he looked at our report, he would probably, in my view, he would come to pretty much the same idea of intrinsic value that he would come to from being around it, you know, for X number of years. The information should be there.
We give you the information that, if the positions were reversed, we would want to get from you.
像可口可樂、吉列以及迪斯尼這樣的企業(yè)，你所需的信息在年報中也是應有盡有。你需要了解它們的業(yè)務，在日常生活中就可以獲得這方面的知識。
這一點在一些高科技企業(yè)中是做不到的，但在有些企業(yè)中你可以做到。然后，你就可以坐下來，描繪這些企業(yè)的未來藍圖。
查理？
And in companies like Coca-Cola or Gillette or Disney or those kind of businesses, you will see the information in the reports. You have to have some understanding of what they’re doing. But you have that in your everyday activities. You’ll get that kind of knowledge.
You won’t get it, you know, in terms of some high-tech company. But you’ll get it with those kind of companies. And, then, you sit down and you try to print out the future.
Charlie?
芒格：我認為，投資篩選標準是機會成本是一個簡單的理念。
如果你已經(jīng)有了一個可以大筆下注的投資機會，且與你看到的其他98%的機會相比，你更喜歡這個機會，你就可以把其余98%的機會剔掉，因為你已經(jīng)知道更好的機會了。
因此，有很多機會可供投資的人獲得的投資通常比機會較少的人好，使用機會成本這個理念來篩選可以作出更好的投資決策。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I would argue that one filter that’s useful in investing is the simple idea of opportunity cost.
If you have one opportunity that you already have available in large quantity, and you like it better than 98 percent of the other things you see, well, you can just screen out the other 98 percent because you already know something better.
So the people who have a lot of opportunities tend to make better investments than people that don’t have a lot of opportunities. And people who have very good opportunities, and using a concept of opportunity cost, they can make better decisions about what to buy.
持有這種態(tài)度，你會得到一個集中度非常高的投資組合——這個我們不介意。我們的做法如此之簡單，可是效仿我們的人卻很少，我不明白這是為什么。伯克希爾的股東倒是普遍效法我們。他們全都學會了這一點。
但它不是投資管理行業(yè)的標準做法，甚至連一些偉大的大學和聰明的機構也不這么做。
這就引出了一個非常有趣的問題：如果我們是對的，為什么大錯特錯的著名企業(yè)是如此之多?（笑聲）
With this attitude, you get a concentrated portfolio, which we don’t mind. That practice of ours, which is so simple, is not widely copied. I do not know why. Now, it’s copied among the Berkshire shareholders. I mean, all of you people have learned it.
But it’s not the standard in investment management, even at great universities and other intellectual institutions.
Very interesting question. If we’re right, why are so many eminent places so wrong? (Laughter)
巴菲特：關于這個問題，有幾個可能的答案。(笑聲)
態(tài)度很重要——我的意思是——如果有人向我們推銷一家企業(yè)，我們腦子里想到的第一件事是，“我們更愿意買人這家企業(yè)，還是更愿意增持可口可樂?我們更愿意購買這家企業(yè)，還是更愿意增持吉列?”
WARREN BUFFETT: There are several possible answers to that question. (Laughter)
The attitude, though — I mean, if somebody shows us a business, you know, the first thing that goes through our head is would we rather own this business than more Coca-Cola? Would we rather own it than more Gillette?
不拿這些未知的新企業(yè)與你非常確定的企業(yè)進行比較是瘋狂的。你能找到的、未來前景和可口可樂一樣確定的公司極少。因此，我們想購買那些確定程度接近可口可樂的公司。然后，我們想弄清楚購買新企業(yè)是否比增持我們已經(jīng)持有的公司更好。
如果每一個管理者都這樣做，在收購他們從來沒有聽說過不相關行業(yè)的企業(yè)之前，就問自己：“收購這家企業(yè)會比回購我們自己的股票更好嗎?比購買可口可樂的股票更好嗎?”如果他們這樣做的話，兼并收購交易將會少很多很多。
It’s crazy not to compare it to things that you’re very certain of. There’s very few businesses that we’ll find that we’re certain of the future about as companies such as that. And therefore, we will want companies where the certainty gets close to that. And, then, we’ll want to figure that we’re better off than just buying more of those.
If every management, before they bought a business in some unrelated deal that they might not have even heard of, you know, more than a short time before that’s being promoted to them, if they said, “Is this better than buying in our own stock, you know? Is this better than even buying, you know, buying Coca-Cola stock or something,” there’d be a lot fewer deals done.
但不知是什么原因，他們似乎沒有這么做——而我們會這么做，會將新的企業(yè)與我們認為我們能夠得到的、近乎完美的企業(yè)進行對比。
查理，說點啥吧？
But they don’t — they tend not to measure — we try to measure against what we regard as close to perfection as we can get.
Charlie, anything?
芒格：過去，內在價值這個概念使用起來要比現(xiàn)在容易得多，因為有許多許多股票的售價在清算價值 的50%以下。
的確，在伯克希爾的歷史上，我們購買的有些證券的價格只有清算價值的20%。
過去，本·格雷厄姆的追隨者只要用蓋革計數(shù)器對美國的公司進行計算，就能找到一些讓他們心動的證券。只要你對企業(yè)的整體市場價格稍微懂一點，就能很容易地發(fā)現(xiàn)你的買入價相對于內在價值打了很大的折扣。
不管管理團隊有多糟糕，如果你的買價只有資產價值的50%甚或30%，你依然可以賺很多錢。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I will say this, that the concept of intrinsic value used to be a lot easier, because there were all kinds of stocks that were selling for 50 percent or less of the amount at which you could’ve easily liquidated the whole corporation if you owned the whole corporation.
Indeed, in the history of Berkshire Hathaway, we’ve bought things at 20 percent of then-liquidating value.
And in the old days, the Ben Graham followers could run their Geiger counters over corporate America. And they could spill out a few things. And you could easily see, if you were at all familiar with the market prices of whole corporations, which you were buying at a huge discount.
Well, no matter how bad the management, if you’re buying at 50 percent of asset value or 30 percent or so on down, you has a lot going for you.
但是隨著投資者逐漸聰明起來，且隨著股票的表現(xiàn)如此之好，好的股票，股價通常會越來越高，以前那種投資方法越來越難賺到錢了。
如今為了找到價格相對于內在價值出現(xiàn)折扣的證券，這些簡單的投資方法一般來說不管用了。你需要采用沃倫的思維方式，而這難得多。
And as the world has wised up and as stocks have behaved so well for people, good stocks, generally, have gone to higher and higher prices. That game gets much harder.
Now, to find something at a discount from intrinsic value, those simple systems, ordinarily, don’t work. You’ve got to get into Warren’s kind of thinking. And that is a lot harder.
如果你從良好的普通教育中掌握了幾個基本的思想，你就能很好地預測一些企業(yè)的未來表現(xiàn)。我在南加州大學商學院演講中說的就是這個意思。
換句話說，根據(jù)幾個簡單的基本因素來抽絲剝繭地進行分析，我們會發(fā)現(xiàn)可口可樂是一家很簡單的公司。
其實理解好市多也不是那么難。你知道——
你必須要了解人類的行為。有一些基本的模型，這些模型很簡單，比數(shù)量機械理論容易掌握多了。你必須得懂一些東西，要真的懂。
I think you can predict the future in a few places best if you understand a few basic ideas that come from a good general education. And that’s what I was talking about in that talk I gave at the USC Business School.
In other words, Coca-Cola’s a simple company if it’s stripped down and analyzed in terms of some elemental forces.
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not hard to understand Costco, either, you know —
There are certain fundamental models out there that do not take — you don’t have the kind of ability that quantum mechanics requires. You just have to know a few simple things and really know them.
巴菲特：當查理說清算價值的時候，他的意思不是關掉企業(yè)清盤后得到的價值。而是其他人為了得到現(xiàn)金流愿意支付的價格——
芒格：對的。
WARREN BUFFETT: When Charlie talks about “l(fā)iquidating value,” he’s not talking about closing up the enterprise. But he’s talking about what somebody else would pay for that stream of cash, too, I mean —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.
巴菲特：舉例來說，你可以看看1974年資本城購買的一些電視臺。這些電視臺的價值是它們售價的好幾倍。這并不是因為你關閉電視臺可以得到這么多價值，而是因為它們的收入流值這么多錢。這完全是因為股市一片低迷。
就像我所說的那樣，如果協(xié)商的話，你可以以幾倍于股價的價格出售公司的資產。還免費獲得了一支優(yōu)秀的管理團隊。
WARREN BUFFETT: You could’ve looked at a collection of television stations owned by Cap Cities, for example, in the early to mid — well, 1974. It would’ve been worth, we’ll say, four times what the company was selling for. Not because you’d close the stations, but just their stream of income was worth that to somebody else. It’s just that the marketplace was very distressed — depressed.
Although, like I say, on a negotiated basis, you could have gone and sold the properties for four times what the company was selling for. And you got wonderful management.
股市會發(fā)生這種事情。以后還將發(fā)生。但投資和計算內在價值還有一個部分是，當你計算完一項資產的內在價值之后，計算結果告訴你“不要買”，這時你不能僅僅因為其他人認為這項資產的價格會上漲、或者因為你的朋友最近輕松發(fā)了一筆橫財?shù)扰c此類似的理由而買入。
你必須丟掉沒有通過篩選的投資機會。最近能夠賺錢的想法少之又少，你必須得做好準備，不碰任何你不懂的投資，我認為這是一個很大的障礙。
I mean, those things happen in markets. They will happen again. But part of investing and calculating intrinsic values is if you get the wrong answer when you get through — in other words, if it says don’t buy, you can’t buy just because somebody else thinks it’s going to up or because your friends have made a lot of easy money lately or anything of the sort.
You just — you have to be able to walk away from anything that doesn’t work. And very few things work these days. You also have to walk away from anything you don’t understand which, in my case, is a big handicap.
芒格：沃倫，如今投資變得更難了，你應該同意我的看法吧，對嗎?
CHARLIE MUNGER: But you would agree, wouldn’t you, Warren, that it’s much harder now?
巴菲特：對。不過我也認為過去40年來幾乎任何時候，在這個舞臺上，我們都可以說投資變得更難了。（笑聲）
但如今投資更難賺錢，難得多了。
現(xiàn)在更難賺錢的部分原因是我們管理的資金量。如果我們管理的資金只有10萬美元，且我們真的需要錢——我們的回報前景將比現(xiàn)在好多了。道理很簡單，如果我們管理的資金量較小，潛在的投資范圍就大多了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But I would also agree that almost anytime over the last 40 years that we’ve been up on a podium, we would’ve said it was much harder in the past, (laughs) too.
But it is harder now. It’s way harder.
Part of it being harder now, too, is the amount of the capital we run. I mean, if we were running $100,000, our prospects for returns would be — and we really needed the money — our prospects for return would be considerably better than they are running Berkshire. It’s very simple. Our universe of possible ideas would expand by a huge factor.
現(xiàn)在，我們考察的很多投資機會也受到了其他很多人的關注。而在以前，很多時候我們關注的機會，其他人幾乎看都不看。
不過過去也有過例外。當我們考察一些投資的時候，全世界對待這些投資就像瘋了一樣，這對我們來說肯定是一大幫助。
We are looking at things today that, by their nature, a lot of people are looking at. And there were times in the past when we were looking at things that very few people were looking at.
But there were other times in the past when we were looking at things where the whole world was just looking at them kind of crazy. And that’s a decided help.
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用《巴菲特和芒格談估值》審視我們的持股 (2012-10-07 )
今天在@基金行業(yè)網(wǎng) 的新浪微博上看到一篇《巴菲特和芒格談估值》，感覺非常的精彩。盡管其中的絕大多數(shù)觀點，我早已熟悉，但這并不影響我重溫它們時的充實和快樂。據(jù)說價值投資人普遍長壽，為什么呢？我想，時常保持的內心寧靜和愉悅一定是其中的重要因素。
我還認為，此文可以當做真正信奉巴式價值投資理念的投資人檢測自己手中持股的經(jīng)典范本。于是，我就以身作則，用文中的幾個重要理念，來審視我的最重要持倉——貴州茅臺。
1、股票類似于100年后到期的債券，不同股票票息率不同。更要命的是不同企業(yè)，壽命不同。
我在去年底一篇博文《如意算盤》中提到，茅臺在停止成長之后，其股票的屬性將類似于一只永不到期的債券。同時我固執(zhí)地認為：茅臺公司的“停止增長”，實際上是“增長等于通脹率”。茅臺酒無與倫比的時間屬性，使得公司產量銷量到達極限之后，其售價的增長一定能跟上CPI的漲幅。
剩下的問題是：茅臺公司的壽命會有多長？有人拿地震說事。我說，茅臺鎮(zhèn)發(fā)生地震的概率，和每一個投資人家里發(fā)生地震的概率是一樣的，所以這個因素可以丟在一邊。價值投資人投資一家公司，未必都要持有20年或以上，但一定要有20年以上看公司的眼光。審視我們的持股，問問自己，我持有的公司20年，甚至100年以后還在不在？會如何？
2、股票內在價值全部都與未來現(xiàn)金流有關。
段永平把價值投資的精髓，濃縮成以下兩句話：買股票就是買公司，買公司就是買其未來現(xiàn)金流（的折現(xiàn)）。高人之間，道是想通的。對于茅臺股票，我相信自己可以比較清晰地看到現(xiàn)在、將來、甚至遙遠的未來，它身上流淌著的澎湃的現(xiàn)金流。審視我們的持股：現(xiàn)金，還是陷阱？
3、投資的本質不是“狗咬狗”游戲，而是你投資的資產的產出。
把“who beats who”翻成“狗咬狗”有點損，但似乎準確形象。股票交易并不產生新的價值，只有公司的資產的產出才能整體創(chuàng)造額外價值。眼下的市場，趨勢投資為什么越來越難做了？一個重要的原因是它的盈利模式是掏別人的口袋?？墒牵?jīng)過一輪又一輪的洗劫，傻子的口袋已經(jīng)基本空了，而剩下的聰明人，把自己的口袋看得越來越緊了。
4、投資的精髓：確定性。投資者關注的是資產，投機者關注的是資產價格。
確定性其實就是未來現(xiàn)金流的預期的確定。投資茅臺股票，我非常在乎我的持股在公司總股本中的占比，也就是說，我首要關注的是我的資產比例，而不是這一資產在股市中時時變動的價格。如果你過于關心自己的“身家”，時刻控制著市值波動的“風險”，天天比較著自己的收益率在市場中的“排名”，那么，就不是巴菲特所認為的“投資者”。從這一點上說，以公墓基金為代表的機構投資人，與“投資”，其實還是有距離的。
5、運用機會成本理念可以更好地進行投資決策。
經(jīng)濟學上的“機會成本”是指：為了得到某種東西所必須放棄的東西。巴菲特芒格最喜歡拿可口可樂股票說事。如果買了其它股票，而不能得到相當于持有可口可樂的收益，那么，這個投資決策就有問題。
今年6月份在我的一篇博文《投資不是技術活》中，主持人問我：我很好奇，那等于您現(xiàn)在的狀態(tài)是，看了茅臺以后，看別的股票都看不上了？我的回答：如果用茅臺的確定性、穩(wěn)定性，成長性以及市盈率作為尺子來衡量，其它個股確實都上不了尺寸。我的這一回答，其實說的就是機會成本的問題。
6、“收購這家企業(yè)會比回購我們自己的股票更好嗎？比購買可口可樂的股票更好嗎？”我們想弄清楚購買新企業(yè)是否比增持我們已經(jīng)持有的公司更好。
前段時間，茅臺股東之間的一個熱烈討論話題是“茅臺股份是否應該把習酒并進來”？我是持否定意見的。原因很簡單：習酒再怎么好，也比不上現(xiàn)在上市的茅臺股份。去年一整年，我都在不斷地增持二級市場股票，不是我不考慮別的投資標的，而是比來比去，確實覺得與其購買新的，不如增持已有的。
投資者在審視持股時，必須問問自己：還有沒有比這些更好的，同時自己也是能搞懂的公司？如果有，那你的持倉就不是最完美的。
7、評估企業(yè)價值可以享受知識日積月累的優(yōu)勢，所以我們喜歡不發(fā)生變化的企業(yè)。
能力圈要求投資者必須搞懂自己所持有的公司。那么，怎么才算搞懂呢？當然是越深入越好。公司的運行，公司的產品最好不要變化，但投資者對公司的認識卻是要不斷地進步和深入。比如，投資茅臺股票的，卻從來沒有喝過茅臺酒，或者喝了也沒覺得有什么好，那么這一投資是有瑕疵的。
我的一個朋友說過一句讓我稱之為“經(jīng)典并精彩”的話：喝茅臺酒的人是不會賣出茅臺股票的！另一方面，經(jīng)常有人指責茅臺酒是“買的不喝，喝的不買”。我想說的是：如果說這話的人既不喝，也不買茅臺酒，那么他得出的茅臺股票高估的結論就很不地道了。
審視我們手中的持股，這些個公司經(jīng)常發(fā)生變化嗎？我們對公司的認知需要不斷地深入，并且隨著我們的深入，對持股公司是不是越來越有信心的呢？若是，OK；若否，有問題。
8、安全邊際需要多大，取決于潛在的風險。你對投資的企業(yè)越懂，潛在的風險就越小。
在這里，巴式投資的“能力圈”和“安全邊際”的兩大投資理念被打通了，融合了，也實用了。巴菲特喜歡所投資的企業(yè)不發(fā)生變化，而我們也景仰巴菲特的投資理念的始終如一，腳踏實際。
9、我犯過的最大的錯誤或者說錯誤類型是，當我發(fā)現(xiàn)某企業(yè)是偉大的企業(yè)時，我不肯支付較高的價格，或者在它的股價漲得較高的時候，我沒能繼續(xù)買入。
當“安全邊際”PK“偉大企業(yè)”時，誰應該退一步呢？巴菲特這一說法給出了答案。
我經(jīng)常聽我認識的人抱怨：茅臺的確是好股票，但是現(xiàn)在太貴了，要是象你一樣前幾年買就好了。我總是笑而不答（因為不叫人買股票是我堅持的原則）。但是，心里相信：今后10年或20年，他們還會不斷地重復著這一說法。
10、估值的思維很簡單，估值的進行很艱難。
我記得巴菲特說過：價值投資，要么馬上領悟，要么一輩子搞不懂。這與智商學識等等，沒有關系。
現(xiàn)金流折現(xiàn)的準確估值，幾乎是“不可能完成的任務”。但是，不能因為無法精確，就否定思維方式。只要方向正確，距離需要到達的目標只會越來越近，這不就是價值投資者心中的愿望嗎？
“買股票就是買公司，買公司就是買其未來現(xiàn)金流（的折現(xiàn)）”。這就是投資的真諦！
