經(jīng)常有人會(huì)好奇，巴菲特年化才20%。真的會(huì)有人模仿巴菲特賺到大錢(qián)嗎？
為什么不去學(xué)那些打板選手？
但據(jù)我所知，通過(guò)跟隨巴老而發(fā)家致富的人多如過(guò)江之鯽。
只不過(guò)，他們跟隨的并不是老巴的具體操作，而是投資方法。
這種方法可以用一句話概括：
利用市場(chǎng)犯錯(cuò)的機(jī)會(huì)，尋找并買(mǎi)入相對(duì)于其未來(lái)折現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流而言，定價(jià)最低的企業(yè)。
很多人對(duì)巴菲特的方法不以為然，常以“資金量級(jí)”或“地位特殊”為由提出質(zhì)疑，比如：“如果我有他那么多錢(qián)也能……”“因?yàn)樗前头铺?，肯定能拿到?nèi)幕信息”等等。
但事實(shí)是，在巴菲特資金規(guī)模還很小的時(shí)候，他的收益率其實(shí)更高。
從1950年底開(kāi)始的十年里，他的年均回報(bào)率約50%，每年能夠跑贏道指約37個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。
年均回報(bào)率約50%是什么概念？
如果你以10萬(wàn)元作為起步資金，接下來(lái)會(huì)發(fā)生這樣的事：
第1年底：10萬(wàn) → 15萬(wàn)（賺5萬(wàn)，感覺(jué)“還不錯(cuò)”）
第2年底：15萬(wàn) → 22.5萬(wàn)（賺7.5萬(wàn)，開(kāi)始多了）
第3年底：22.5萬(wàn) → 33.75萬(wàn)（總收益已超本金）
第4年底：33.75萬(wàn) → 約50.6萬(wàn)（翻5倍）
第5年底：50.6萬(wàn) → 約75.9萬(wàn)（接近76萬(wàn)?。?/span>
看清楚了嗎？5年時(shí)間，10萬(wàn)變成76萬(wàn)——這已經(jīng)非常驚人。
但真正的好戲，還在后頭。
復(fù)利最可怕的特點(diǎn)，就是越到后期，增長(zhǎng)越瘋狂。
第7年底：資金將達(dá)到約170萬(wàn)
第10年底：資金變成約576萬(wàn)。
如果你以100萬(wàn)呢？
第1年底：100萬(wàn) → 150萬(wàn)（盈利50萬(wàn)，已相當(dāng)于一線城市的高年薪）
第2年底：150萬(wàn) → 225萬(wàn)（再賺75萬(wàn)，兩年盈利超本金）
第3年底：225萬(wàn) → 337.5萬(wàn)（年利潤(rùn)112.5萬(wàn)，超過(guò)很多人一輩子存款）
第4年底：337.5萬(wàn) → 506萬(wàn)（突破500萬(wàn)）
第5年底：506萬(wàn) → 759萬(wàn)（5年變760萬(wàn)，相當(dāng)于一家中小企業(yè)的年?duì)I業(yè)額）
而真正的爆發(fā)，現(xiàn)在才開(kāi)始：
第7年底：約1700萬(wàn)（一線城市核心地段一套豪宅）
第10年底：約5760萬(wàn)（接近6000萬(wàn)，資產(chǎn)級(jí)別徹底改變，你已成為別人眼中的“富豪”）
恭喜你，現(xiàn)在的你已經(jīng)是一臺(tái)人形”合法印鈔機(jī)“。
而這也正是巴菲特的真實(shí)的來(lái)時(shí)路。
記得在某次股東問(wèn)答中，他親自拆解過(guò)自己的這套心法。
那是在2001年伯克希爾·哈撒韋股東大會(huì)，一位名叫Michael Zenger的股東提問(wèn)，如果現(xiàn)在重新開(kāi)始，用一小筆錢(qián)投資，你會(huì)采用哪種方法？”
巴菲特的回答非常清晰：“我現(xiàn)在用的方法，仍然是努力尋找那些相對(duì)于其未來(lái)折現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流而言定價(jià)最低的企業(yè)。
以下便是這段問(wèn)答的全文：
Michael Zenger（股東):
Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. I’m Michael Zenger from Danvers, Massachusetts. That’s the town whose band Mr. Buffett so generously sent to the Rose Bowl Parade last year, so you’re a very popular guy in my town. Mr. Buffett, I wanted to ask you this question last week when I ran into you after Gillette’s annual meeting, but I choked. So now, with no pressure, here goes. From my reading, in the years from 1956 through 1969, you achieved the best results of your career quantitatively—29% annually against only 7% for the Dow.
Your approach then was different than now. You looked for lots of undervalued stocks with less attention to competitive advantage or favorable economics and sold them rather quickly. As your capital base grew, you switched your approach to buying undervalued, excellent companies with favorable long-term economics.
My question is, if you were investing a small sum today, which approach would you use?
……據(jù)我所知，在1956至1969年間，您取得了職業(yè)生涯中最亮眼的量化投資回報(bào)——年化收益率29%，而同期道指漲幅僅為7%。
您當(dāng)時(shí)的策略與現(xiàn)在截然不同。那時(shí)您尋找大量被低估的股票，較少關(guān)注競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)或行業(yè)前景，并會(huì)快速轉(zhuǎn)手。隨著資金規(guī)模擴(kuò)大，您轉(zhuǎn)向收購(gòu)被低估的優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)，并看重其長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展?jié)摿ΑＮ业膯?wèn)題是：若您如今用少量資金投資，會(huì)采用哪種策略？
Warren Buffett:
Well, I would use the approach that I think I’m using now, of trying to search out businesses where I think they’re selling at the lowest price relative to the discounted cash they would produce in the future.
But if I were working with a small amount of money, the universe would be huge compared to the universe of possible ideas I work with now.
You mentioned 1956 to 1969 was the best period. Actually, my best period was before that, from right after I met Ben Graham in early 1951. But from the end of 1950 through the next 10 years, actually, returns averaged about 50% a year, and I think they were 37 points better than the Dow per year or something like that.
But I was working with a tiny, tiny, tiny amount of money. And so I would pore through volumes of businesses, and I would find one or two that I could put $10,000 into or $15,000 into that were just ridiculously cheap.Obviously, as the money increased, the universe of possible ideas started shrinking dramatically. The times were also better for doing it in that time.
But I think if you’re working with a small amount of money, with exactly the same background that Charlie and I have, and the same ideas, same ability we have, I think you can make very significant sums.
But as soon as you start getting the money up into the many millions, the curve on expectable results falls off just dramatically. That’s the nature of it. When you get up to things you can put millions of dollars into, you’ve got a lot of competition looking at that. And they’re not looking, as I did when I started.
When I started, I went through the pages of the manuals page by page. I mean, I went through 20,000 pages in the Moody’s industrial, transportation, banks, and finance manuals, and I did it twice. I actually looked at every business. I didn’t look very hard at some, but that’s not a practical way to invest tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.
So I would say, if you’re working with a small sum of money and you’re really interested in the business and willing to do the work, you will find something. There’s no question in my mind you will find some things that promise very large returns compared to what we will be able to deliver with large sums of money. Charlie?
我會(huì)沿用當(dāng)前策略：尋找那些現(xiàn)價(jià)與其未來(lái)折現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流相比最為低估的企業(yè)。但如果操作小額資金，可選標(biāo)的范圍將遠(yuǎn)大于現(xiàn)在。您提到1956-1969是最佳時(shí)期，實(shí)際上我收益最高的階段是1951年初師從本·格雷厄姆之后。從1950年底開(kāi)始的十年間，年化收益率約50%，每年跑贏道指約37個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。
當(dāng)時(shí)我運(yùn)作的資金規(guī)模極小，因此能逐頁(yè)研讀大量公司資料，找到可投入1-1.5萬(wàn)美元的極度低估標(biāo)的。隨著資金量增長(zhǎng)，可選范圍急劇縮小，那個(gè)時(shí)代本身也更利于此類(lèi)操作。我認(rèn)為若具備與我們相同的認(rèn)知和能力，用小額資金能創(chuàng)造驚人回報(bào)。但一旦資金量達(dá)到數(shù)百萬(wàn)級(jí)別，預(yù)期收益曲線就會(huì)急劇下滑，這是必然規(guī)律。當(dāng)需要部署大資金時(shí)，你會(huì)面臨大量競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，而他們不像我起步時(shí)那樣深耕研究。
當(dāng)初我逐頁(yè)翻閱穆迪工業(yè)、運(yùn)輸、銀行與金融手冊(cè)共計(jì)兩萬(wàn)頁(yè)，研讀了每個(gè)行業(yè)（某些只是略讀），但這種方法對(duì)于數(shù)千萬(wàn)乃至數(shù)億美元的資金運(yùn)作并不現(xiàn)實(shí)。因此我認(rèn)為，若資金量小且真正熱衷研究，必定能找到回報(bào)潛力遠(yuǎn)超大資金運(yùn)作機(jī)會(huì)的標(biāo)的。
Charlie Munger:
Well, yeah, I think that’s right. A brilliant man who can’t get any money from other people and is working with a very small sum probably should work in very obscure stocks, searching out unusual mispriced opportunities. But that’s such a small world. It may be a way for one person to come up, but it’s a long slog.
的確如此。一個(gè)無(wú)法募資的聰明人若操作小額資金，應(yīng)該聚焦冷門(mén)股票，尋找異常的錯(cuò)誤定價(jià)機(jī)會(huì)。但這只是狹小領(lǐng)域，雖是個(gè)人投資者的晉升途徑，卻需要漫長(zhǎng)艱苦的努力。
Warren Buffett:
Yeah, most smart people, unfortunately, in Wall Street figure that they can make a lot more money a lot easier just by, one way or another, getting an override on other people’s money or delivering services in some way.
And the monetization of hope and greed, you know, is a way to make a huge amount of money. Right now, just take hedge funds. I’ve had calls from a couple of friends in the last month that don’t know anything about investing money. They’ve been unsuccessful in everything else, and, you know, one of them called me and said, “Well, I’m forming a small hedge fund, $125 million.” He was talking like, since it was only $125 million, maybe we ought to put in $10 million or something. I mean, if you looked at this fellow’s Schedule C on his 1040 for the last 20 years, you’d think he ought to be mowing lawns. But he may get his $125 million. It’s just astounding to me how willing people are during a bull market just to toss money around because they think it’s easy.
And, of course, that’s what they felt about internet stocks a few years ago. They’ll think about something else next year, too. But the biggest money made in Wall Street in recent years has not been made by great performance but has been made by great promotion, basically. Charlie, do you have anything?
遺憾的是，華爾街多數(shù)聰明人發(fā)現(xiàn)通過(guò)管理他人資金提取績(jī)效提成（override）或提供金融服務(wù)能更輕松賺錢(qián)。利用希望與貪婪變現(xiàn)（monetization of hope and greed）能創(chuàng)造巨額財(cái)富。以對(duì)沖基金為例：最近有幾位不懂投資的朋友聯(lián)系我，他們此前諸事不順，卻有人聲稱(chēng)"正在組建1.25億美元的小型對(duì)沖基金"，還暗示我們?cè)撏兑磺f(wàn)。若查看這人過(guò)去20年的納稅申報(bào)表（Schedule C on 1040），你會(huì)覺(jué)得他該去修剪草坪（mowing lawns）。但在牛市中，人們竟輕率投錢(qián)只因以為容易賺錢(qián)。幾年前對(duì)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)股票如此，明年又會(huì)追捧其他東西。近年來(lái)華爾街最大財(cái)富并非來(lái)自卓越投資，而是靠高超營(yíng)銷(xiāo)
Charlie Munger:
Well, I would state it even more strongly. I think the current scene is obscene. I think there’s too much mania, there’s too much chasing after easy money, there’s too much misleading sales material about investments, there’s too much on the television emphasizing speculation in stocks.
我想說(shuō)得更尖銳些：當(dāng)前景象堪稱(chēng)荒唐（obscene）：存在太多狂熱（mania）、太多對(duì)賺快錢(qián)的追逐、太多誤導(dǎo)性投資宣傳材料、太多電視節(jié)目鼓吹股票投機(jī)。
……
彼時(shí)彼刻，恰似此時(shí)此刻。
▇翼之說(shuō)：
你好，我是王翼之。
最近想到：四十歲之后，可以把每件事重做一遍。
我也會(huì)在這里持續(xù)分享重做之后積累的9類(lèi)心得↓
#時(shí)間管理的秘密
#升維思考
#書(shū)是可能性
#自我治愈
#賺錢(qián)是一種開(kāi)卷考試
#寫(xiě)作本能
#歷史是個(gè)小孩子
#重新理解品牌
#創(chuàng)業(yè)猶如成一事
……
如果巔峰留不住，那就重走來(lái)時(shí)路。
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